The failure of the UN envoy Tan Sri Razali Ismail to obtain a concrete time frame for political dialogue last weekend pointed to the lack of concerted international pressure - including that of Thailand - to further propel the much awaited process.
It should surprise nobody that the junta leaders in Rangoon prefer to drag their feet further. Their unwillingness to enter into political dialogue is indicative of the hardening attitude towards democratisation inside Burma. They know full well that the global community, the region in particular, probably cares less about the plight of Aung San Suu Kyi and the lack of democratic reforms in Burma since the war on Iraq and threats from al-Qaeda networks are now the top agenda.
If this trend continues, it is almost certain that the process of political reconciliation will be stalled. Early last month, Suu Kyi said the frustration of the Burmese people in waiting for the political dialogue was building up to an unhealthy level. She knows this because during her visits upcountry throngs of people showed up and discussed the current situation with her.
The junta leaders have moved forward at a pace they feel comfortable with in order to ease outside pressures and to provide a facade of political normalcy. This way there will be no consensus on Burma. Most importantly, donors will be split on whether to provide further assistance to Burma. The regime has been successful in utilising this tactic to divide and rule donors. The regime thinks, correctly enough, that as long as the promised process continues, no matter how slow it is, the international community will not be able to mobilise concerted pressure as in the past.
For instance, despite strong words from Japan and Australia, these two countries have chosen to engage Burma and provide humanitarian assistance and human-rights training. More and more countries are following this route. In addition, sensing the global concern over the widespread HIV/Aids epidemic in Burma, the junta has deftly used this threat to draw in foreign aid and, along with it, legitimacy. This is exactly the ideal formula that the regime has been exploiting to disarm and further undermine the National League of Democracy.
Furthermore, since the most famous dissident, Suu Kyi was released after 19 months of house arrest, the biggest pressure point has been eliminated. Since then, the regime has spared no time in revitalising ties with humanitarian organisations and co-opting donors with pledges for political reforms. The message is that democratic changes in Burma will take time and that the opposition is not yet ready for dialogue, let alone future power sharing. The conclusion is that both sides need more time. Sad but true, some governments found this propaganda convincing.
Even though the UN, the US and the EU have persistently called for the release of all political prisoners as soon as possible to kick-start political dialogue, the regime has not responded. If anything, Razali's role as an honest broker is now also in jeopardy.
Despite Razali's early success in securing Suu Kyi's release in May, his latest trip indicates that his prestige and earlier influence over the regime are fading fast. No wonder that he has threatened to resign from his job if the regime continues to resist democratic reforms and fails to live up to its promises.
When Razali was appointed UN envoy for Burma two years ago, hope was high that he would be able to move the political process along. This he was able to do as he was strongly backed by the unyielding United Nations and Western countries. Asean also supported Razali's efforts. Apparently, all that has been gradually evaporating.
In addition, nobody knows exactly to what extent the revelation that Razali represented a company with business interests in Burma had anything to do with his creditability and influence vis-a-vis the junta over the political process. The UN said it was not a case of conflict of interest. Be that as it may, it has certainly made his role as an honest broker more difficult. The Burmese junta leaders know that all too well.
It is imperative that the UN, US and EU must bring concerted pressure to bear on the regime and reinforce, if not augment, economic sanctions. Any further humanitarian assistance must be contingent on the progress of political dialogue with the NLD.
Vice versa, beyond the international pressure, Thai policy towards Burma must change. Since Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra took power in February 2001 he has eliminated all the leverage that the country used to enjoy in pressuring Burma for political reforms. Instead, he appeased the Burmese junta leaders in every way in exchange for better economic ties with Thailand - a 180-degree turnaround from the previous years.
It was between April 2000 and February 2001 that Thai policy towards Burma was most effective. For the first time, all concerned authorities, civilian and military, pursued a common strategy to send strong signals to Burma that Thailand meant business in settling transnational issues and that Burma should engage in a national reconciliation process.
The Thai position was backed strongly by the US and EU. With Thailand in the lead, the international pressure continued to grow. In a rare display of courage, Thailand broke ranks with Asean in July 2000 when it refused to support Burma at the ILO's annual deliberation. Bangkok's decision was lauded and indeed provided a much-needed impetus towards the international effort to continue pressure on the junta.
To reinvigorate concerted international pressure, Thailand must take the lead by abandoning the current myopic path of backing the junta leaders. If the past 14 years of wrangling is anything to judge by, there is a correlation between the Thai position and the level of international support.
With Thailand showing concern about the political process of its most important neighbour, its friends overseas would probably become less reluctant.