If bilateral issues dominate bilateral consultations, the timing of yesterday's annual talks between Malaysian and Indonesian leaders called for an exception to be made. And their countries' parts in extricating the whole region from the Burmese quagmire cried out for it.
The catalyst would have been the decision, made known last Sunday, of Razali Ismail, the Malaysian diplomat, to quit the job of United Nations special envoy for Burma. Just days earlier, the generals in Burma put off a scheduled visit to the country by Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar, snubbing a decision by Asean, and increasing cause to regret its induction of the regime.
Indonesia has not only been among the most outspoken critics of Rangoon in Asean, its venerated elder diplomat - Ali Alatas - has been stepping up his profile over the past two years. In 2003, he held talks with Aung San Suu Kyi in Rangoon. Last August, as a special envoy for UN reform, he held extensive discussions with the junta's chief - Senior Gen Than Shwe.
Given the delicacy of the situation, Malaysia and Indonesia cannot be expected to talk about their leaders' discussions of the issue, if any took place. But there is no doubt that regional states, including - if not especially - Thailand, must put heads together to assess why the bid to use an astute regional diplomat endowed with the prestige of a UN title went wrong.
Was the flaw traceable to Mr Razali the person or to the institutions he was associated with - the UN, the Malaysian government, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
The answer is important to the other question being pondered: Will another UN special envoy do better than Mr Razali, or should friends of Burma's aggrieved people find a new way of bringing the ruling generals to their senses.
The caucus of regional legislators spearheaded by Malaysians was quick to suggest a concerted effort. Their argument: separate attempts in the past - by Asean, the US, the European Union, the dissident National League for Democracy of Aung San Suu Kyi and the parliamentary caucus - have not borne fruit.
This is true but suggesting such a course is easier said than done. The practical problems of moving such a large alliance - including three institutions well known to be bogged down in procedures, the UN, the EU and Asean - are formidable. Importantly, they could prolong the process beyond limits acceptable to the allies and the Burmese people whose lives it seeks to improve. The problems are obvious: Who should lead, what should be programmed, and how it should be implemented.
The question then is what is a practical alternative to attempts by individual countries like the US, a group of immediate neighbours like Asean, of distant donors like the EU and by the mother of all organisations like the UN.
The effect of a higher level of attention from the UN - in recent debates in New York - seems unimpressive. The generals continue to keep Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, and another 1,200 plus political prisoners in jail. And diplomats and the few UN agencies represented in the country remain on edge with the transfer of the capital from Rangoon to Pyinmana - which poses problems of access to the junta so necessary to their work.
In different or more committed ways, Asean and the UN must stay engaged. Mr Razali and Thailand agree on this. The Thai foreign ministry spokesman has called on the UN to continue building peace in Burma; on the junta to appreciate the need to maintain a contact channel with the world community; and on the generals to set a new date for Asean's anointed delegate to visit the country.
At the same time, Asean and the UN among others must encourage more pro-active parts by China and India - the Asian giants who are extending help to Burma and seeking to tap its resources and strategic position.
Though China has invested much in Burma in terms of aid, and some generals have benefitted from the profits that Chinese businessmen have made, reports suggest that familiarity with the long-staying Chinese has bred contempt in some Burmese quarters.
This, therefore is a chance for India, whose rapprochement with the junta came relatively late, to make an impact that will bring forward the process of peace and national reconciliation.