Question mark over change in Myanmar

ROBERT H. TAYLOR
THE STRAITS TIMES, SINGAPORE
April 24, 2004

The writer is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South-east Asian Studies.

MAY 17: That's the date of the first meeting of Myanmar's reconvened constitutional convention. In the coming weeks, there will be intense speculation as to who will attend the event and what they will be able to achieve.

There'll be attention paid to whether the National League for Democracy (NLD), the party of Ms Aung San Suu Kyi, will be willing to participate in the proceedings. The military government, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), appears set to finalise the country's third post-independence Constitution, whether or not all the potential members of the convention, including the NLD, cooperate.

The Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt, laid out a 'road map' for that process in August last year, and the head of state, Senior General Than Shwe, publicly endorsed it in several speeches subsequently.

Following three years of deliberations punctuated by frequent and sometimes lengthy adjournments, the constitutional convention last met in early 1996. The convention has now drafted 104 points of principle covering six chapters to be included in a new basic law.

Key among the points already confirmed is a leading role for the military in the future government. That point and others, as well as the constrained manner in which the convention was run, led the NLD to cease its participation not long after Ms Suu Kyi's first release from house arrest in 1995.

Now the NLD leadership who participated in the first convention have been sent invitations to the renewed convention, but have indicated they will not take their seats until and unless she and NLD vice-chairman Tin Oo are released from their third house arrest and permitted to renew their political activities.

The atmospherics ahead of the May 17 deadline suggest that little has changed from the NLD's point of view since 1996. But until Ms Suu Kyi herself publicly pronounces her party's posture, there is no way of knowing whether the NLD is willing to compromise with the military in order, perhaps, to share power in the future.

While it does not seem that the NLD's attitude towards the government has changed, other factors suggest that this time, the army will press on regardless.

Among the changes since the original convention met is the conclusion of a number of ceasefire agreements with ethnic minority insurgent armies. Now known as 'peace groups', most have indicated a willingness to participate in the national convention in the expectation that the autonomy they have agreed on implicitly with the central government will become a constitutionally guaranteed reality.

Even the Karen National Union (KNU), the oldest of Myanmar's many former separatist forces, has reached a virtual ceasefire agreement and will be finalising some kind of deal in the near future.

CHANGING TIES

Another major change is in Myanmar's foreign relations. While relations with the United States and most members of the European Union have deteriorated further since 1993, especially following the May 2003 attack on Ms Suu Kyi's convoy, relations with Myanmar's immediate neighbours have improved vastly.

While China remains Myanmar's most significant source of assistance, India has abandoned its former support for Ms Suu Kyi and has developed very positive economic, commercial and defence ties with the SPDC.

Moreover, Myanmar is now a member of Asean, and indeed it is this that perhaps ensures that the constitutional framing process will achieve some degree of finality in the next 18 months.

In 2006, Myanmar will assume the Asean chairmanship and host a summit of Asean heads of state. Regularising the constitutional position of the government of Myanmar by that date is an important goal for both Myanmar and Asean.

If the NLD does not participate in the upcoming convention, or joins it and then walks out a second time, Western governments will not find a new Constitution which guarantees a leading role for the military acceptable. The argument will be that it is merely window dressing.

The SPDC will reply that the new Constitution is in keeping with Myanmar's unique history and acceptable to the people. This will be demonstrated, it will contend, in a national referendum which must approve a new Constitution before it takes effect. If the NLD objects, it will then have the opportunity to demonstrate that the people support its version of democracy rather than the new Constitution.

It is now nearly 16 years since Myanmar has had a constitutional government. Until a Constitution is agreed upon, no political actor in the country will be certain of his or her rights and obligations. The uncertainty and ambiguity that surrounds the agreements that the military government has entered into with the ceasefire groups, political parties other than the NLD, non-government organisations and other actors, will not be resolved until a Constitution is agreed on.

Whether the NLD will see the constitutional convention, which by its standards is not sufficiently democratic, as a first, if partial, step towards a more democratic future, or an obstacle to be overcome, should be revealed before long.