Space for an enhanced Indian role in Burma appears to be opening up with Burma's new government taking tentative steps towards democratization of the country. Not only will this enable India to engage without inhibitions, Burma's rulers could also turn to India for experience in building democratic institutions and processes.
During President U Thein Sein's visit to India last week, for the first time in several decades India's handshake with Burma's president was far from awkward.
In the past, Delhi has hosted the entire top brass of Burma's military junta, including the chairman of the State Peace and Development Council, Senior General Than Shwe; its vice chairman, Vice Senior General Maung Aye, as well as Thein Sein in his earlier avatar as prime minister in the military government.
Although it rolled out the red carpet, it was clearly embarrassed with shaking hands with these military rulers. Officials would go on the defensive explaining India's interaction with the junta. Under sharp criticism at home and abroad for its courting of the junta, Delhi sought to keep its relationship with Burma under wraps, especially denying the military cooperation between the two countries.
That is now changing. India's engagement of President Thein Sein in Delhi last week was far from defensive.
Although a former general who came to power through a deeply flawed election, Thein Sein is reportedly a moderate and keen on reform. In recent months he has taken small but significant steps towards making his government inclusive and seeking reconciliation with the opposition.
He is engaging in talks with the junta's bete noire and National League for Democracy (NLD) leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. Thein Sein's government has granted amnesty to about 200 political prisoners, ended restrictions on the Internet and lifted the ban on trade union activity. In an attempt at building confidence, he has appointed a former liaison officer to Suu Kyi as his minister of social welfare, relief and resettlement and her close friend, U Myint, as his chief economic adviser.
India was among a handful of countries that had quietly supported general elections in Myanmar last year. Unlike the West, which focussed on the flaws in the election, Delhi saw in it opportunity for change. It was in fact keen on the NLD contesting the election.
The risk Delhi took in backing the elections appears to have paid off. Burma has a long way to go before it can be regarded democratic, but for the first time in five decades there is hope.
While some continue to dismiss Thein Sein's moves as superficial and unlikely to last, Suu Kyi herself has welcomed them, admitting that he seems to want to "achieve positive change".
It was against the backdrop of these positive changes that Thein Sein visited India.
India signaled its strong support to Thein Sein's reform efforts by announcing a US$500 million credit line to Burma - its largest ever - for specific projects, including irrigation. This comes in addition to $300 million of credit extended last year towards construction of railways, roads, power transmission lines and oil refineries.
Congratulating Burma's president for "the transition towards democratic government", India "offered all necessary assistance in further strengthening this democratic transition".
Two decades ago, India was among the most vociferous champions of Burma's pro-democracy movement. Following the brutal suppression of mass protests in 1988 and in the wake of the NLD's landslide victory in the 1990 elections, it sharply rebuked the military rulers and called on them to hand over power to the NLD. For some years thereafter, its diplomatic efforts were focussed on pushing for restoration of democracy in Burma.
Then from the mid-1990s it changed tack. Its "Look East" policy, counter-insurgency operations in the northeast, its interest in Myanmar's energy and other resources as well as China's growing influence in Burma forced it to engage with the generals, rather than confront them. This required it to tone down criticism of the junta, especially its human-rights violations.
Consequently, over the past decade, the focus of India's policy towards Burma was economic and security cooperation. That has changed in recent months. Increasingly, its engagement is people-centric. As K Yhome, research fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, a think-tank in New Delhi, told Asia Times Online in June, India "is now beginning to broad-base this engagement to include cooperation and capacity-building in health, agriculture and education". Agriculture provides employment to two-thirds of Burma.
The areas of India-Burma cooperation can be expected to expand further to include democratic institution-building, capacity building, people-to-people contact, etc.
As noted Indian political commentator B G Varghese points out, "Rather than be a passive spectator or late actor, India should move energetically to engage the new Thein Sein administration to assist and encourage its transition to full democracy, ethnic reconciliation and economic and social reconstruction at all levels, governmental and non-official.
"Why shouldn't the [Indian] government and credible civil society institutions invite delegations of Burmese parliamentarians, trade representatives, ethnic nationality groups and security analysts to visit India and talk to their counterparts and potential collaborators here? Scholarships and seats in training institutions should be readily on offer as this is perhaps Burma's greatest need. Charter flights should be organized both ways to promote tourism and understanding. And high level Indian political and trade and investment delegations should visit Burma as early as possible," Varghese said.
These steps should help hitherto reclusive Burma come out of its isolation.
The Thein Sein government will also be looking to India to convince the United States and Europe to lift sanctions against Burma.
There are signs too that Burma is seeking to reduce its dependence on China. The Thein Sein government recently suspended a $3.6 billion Myitsone dam project that China was constructing in Kachin State. This is the first time since the two became close allies in 1988 that Myanmar has snubbed Beijing. Should this become more than a one-off tiff between the two, Myanmar can be expected to look for other partners. It could increasingly look to Delhi.
To what extent India will benefit from Burma's reported distancing from Beijing depends on how serious the rift is. Many believe that the suspension of the dam project by the Thein Sein government is an eyewash aimed at signaling to the international community that the new government is responsive to the sentiments of the people, especially the ethnic minorities, and that the Sino-Burma bond has not weakened.
However, Burma's military, their close ties with Beijing post-1988 notwithstanding, distrust the Chinese. Many in the armed forces, especially those of the older generation, were involved in fighting the Burmese Communist Party's armed insurgency for decades. They have not forgotten China's role in nurturing and fueling that insurgency.
And its not just the military that is suspicious of China, the public too, especially in towns like Mandalay that have become Sinicized by the influx of Chinese, are deeply apprehensive of their giant neighbor to the north. Thus, if Burma's government persists with being responsive to public sentiment, it will be keen to reduce its extreme dependence on China.
Given its deep distrust of all foreign powers, whether western or Asian, Burma will avoid turning too much to India for support through its transition. Yet it is likely that the bilateral bond will deepen in the coming years should it move towards democratization.
However, an expansion in India's role in Burma is not inevitable. India has been executing projects in Burma at a glacial pace. The Kaladan multimodal transport project [1], the Tamanthi and Shwezaye hydropower projects [2] are running way behind schedule, contributing to a perception in Burma that Indian companies, unlike the Chinese, do not deliver on time.
India it seems is its worst enemy in Burma. Conditions for an expansion in its role there are ripe. But it will have to pull up its socks if it wants to play a larger role in that country.
Notes
1. The Kaladan project envisages connectivity between Indian ports on the eastern seaboard and Sittwe Port in Burma and then through riverine transport and by road to Mizoram, thereby providing an alternate route for transport of goods to northeast India.
2. India's government-owned National Hydroelectric Power Corp in 2008 signed an agreement with the Burmese government to develop the 1,200-megawatt Tamanthi and 600-megawatt Shwezaye hydroelectric projects on Burma's Chindwin River.