Hope of democratic reforms in Burma are fading fast. Burma’s military leadership has hardened its attitude to the democratic opposition led by Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Rangoon’s generals seem set on their seven-point “roadmap for democracy’’ with or without the support of the National League for Democracy which won the 1990 general elections. Their goal is obvious: to legitimise the military’s political role.
An indication of the junta’s fist-clenching posture was the arrest of Suu Kyi in May last year. She had been released from house arrest in May 2002, and was busy meeting her supporters and re-building her party’s grassroot-level organisations. During one such journey, on 30 May 2003, Suu Kyi and her party were brutally attacked by thugs allegedly sponsored by the regime.
Suu Kyi and NLD vice-chairman U Tin Oo were taken prisoner, and several members and supporters of the NLD were reportedly killed in this attack. Burmese pro-democracy activists now refer to this attack as the “Depayin massacre’’.
Global outrage
Suu Kyi’s arrest provoked outrage across the globe, including in India, the United States, the European Union and the Association of South East Asian Nations. The Burmese military government’s response came in the form of a document that purports to support democracy but is an attempt to subvert democratic institutions. There was no time-frame for the seven-point “roadmap for democracy.
The junta appointed the powerful military intelligence chief, General Khin Nyunt, Prime Minister in August 2003. The roadmap, among other things, recommends reconvening a national convention whose members were handpicked by the junta and completion of a draft new constitution. The junta abolished Burma’s last constitution when it came into power in 1988 and the country has no constitution now.
The convention, initiated in 1993, was suspended three years later after NLD delegates walked out in protest, accusing the government of preventing their functioning in a democratic manner. On 17 May this year, the Burmese regime re-convened the convention, but the NLD opted to stay out after the junta refused to release Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo and allow party offices to reopen. Political parties representing Burma’s key ethnic nationalities which had successfully contested the 1990 election — among them the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) — followed NLD’s lead and refused to participate in the convention.
Outside Burma, UN secretary-general Kofi Annan and several governments, including those of Thailand and Malaysia, voiced their concern. The UN human rights envoy to Burma, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, stated that the convention, in its current incarnation, lacks credibility. “This political transition will not work; it will not work on the Moon, it will not work on Mars”, he said. “They (the military leaders) can insist, but they will not be successful”.
None of this deters the Burmese government. The convention opened on 17 May with 1,076 delegates, including representatives of the Kachin Independence Organisation. What the ruling military government, the election-winning NLD and non-Burmese ethnic groups did was to adopt a common and pragmatic approach towards resolving the country’s long-standing political stalemate. This deadlock prevented Burma from developing into a modern and truly democratic nation. All stakeholders, including the Myanmar Armed Forces, must live up to their role in national reconciliation and nation-rebuilding and recognise the vital role others have to play.
Burma and India have historically had close ties and cultural links. Buddhism originated in India and flourished in Burma. Burma’s first generation growing up under colonial rule received its higher education at Calcutta University. Independent India lent its constitutional expert Sir BN Rau to Burma when Burma’s post-independent future was being drawn up.
Strategic interests
Pandit Nehru and Burma’s independence hero Aung San, father of Suu Kyi, were “brothers-in-arms” in their fight against colonialism. Netaji based his Azad Hind Fauj in Burma during World War II. On his way to London to conclude the Aung San-Attlee Agreement for Burma’s independence from the British, Aung San stopped over in Delhi to confer with Nehru who gave a coat to Aung San so that he could shield himself from Europe’s harsh winter. Wearing that coat, Aung San became Burma’s national symbol.
India offered asylum to U Nu, the first and last democratically elected Prime Minister of independent Burma after he was overthrown by a military coup, led by General Ne Win, in 1962. When a nationwide pro-democracy uprising broke out in 1988, India under Rajiv Gandhi supported the Burmese democracy movement. In 1993, the Indian government honoured Suu Kyi with a high civilian award, the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding.
India has adopted a realistic approach in pursuit of its strategic interests. Since 1998, India has extended $50 million in credit to the Burmese regime. Another $57 million will be given to upgrade the Rangoon-Mandalay railway. In addition, India has contributed $27 million to the building of the 160-km Tamu-Kalewa highway. India has become Burma’s second largest export market after Thailand, absorbing 25% of Burma’s total exports. India also hopes to double bilateral trade with Burma to $1 billion in the next three years. It is planning to buy gas from Burma, benefiting the military regime to the tune of millions of dollars.
Engagement with the military junta stems from a multiplicity of factors. Modern-day Burma poses a strategic challenge on India’s eastern flank and at its maritime frontiers. The increasing Chinese influence in Burma and in the Indo-Burmese region has worried India. Chinese support to various insurgency groups in the north-east and the fact that Burma has served as a base for many of these insurgents has led the Indian government to engage with Burma’s military government.
India, perhaps, hopes to avoid or limit a Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. It is also likely that India hopes it could prevent Burma from becoming a Chinese pawn moving against India’s economic and security interests. Moreover, Burma is seen as India’s gateway to Asia, in particular to South-east Asia. At the end of 2003, Indian vice-president Bhairon Singh Shekhawat visited Burma. The Burmese military junta’s General Than Shwe is set to visit India in the near future.
It is debatable, however, whether India’s so-called “strategic interests” have been served by its past decade of friendship with Burma’s dictatorial regime. I am not arguing that India should reverse its current policy on Burma. However, India has scope for positive action. Rangoon’s generals should not be left in any doubt that India stands firmly by the democratic aspirations of the Burmese people.
At present, around 1,500 Burmese refugees and asylum-seekers live in New Delhi. About half of them are recognised by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as refugees. But the rehabilitation of Burmese refugees in India has been a major UNHCR failure. The majority of Burmese in India face tremendous hardship. UNHCR has started implementing a phase-out programme, which cuts the meagre subsistence allowance to refugees on the assumption that refugees should earn their livelihood in India. However, the majority of Burmese in New Delhi have no access to remunerated work.
Burmese prisoners
The case of 36 Burmese prisoners in the Andaman Islands also deserves attention. On 12 February, 1998, the Indian army arrested 36 Burmese nationals — 25 Arakans and 11 Karens — in a military operation called “Operation Leech” in the Andamans Sea. They were charged in 1999 under the “Arms and Explosive Substance Act” and under section 3(1) (b) of the “National Security Act” of 1980. The Indian military failed to produce the evidence to prove these allegations. For more than six years, these Burmese have been held without trial. India’s foreign policy towards Burma must be based on the common aspirations of the two peoples: democracy.
Natwar Singh, India’s present foreign minister, wrote in 1995 in an article entitled “The Heroic Lady of Myanmar”: ”I conclude by appealing that India do more to expose the totalitarian regime of Burma and make every effort to ensure Suu Kyi’s unconditional release. That is the least we can do for Aung San’s brave daughter”. The UN’s special envoy to Burma, Razali Ismail, recently urged India to apply pressure on the Burmese military junta to release Suu Kyi.
India’s new government is alarmed at reliable reports suggesting that the Burmese government has succeeded in purchasing nuclear-reactor technology from North Korea. Without doubt, there would be great cause for Indian concern if Burma, which has comfortable friendships with China and Pakistan (both nuclear nations), attains nuclear status.
The least India can do for Burmese democracy is to help expose the authoritarian rule in Burma.