India's decade-long efforts to engage Burma's ruling generals touched a new high last week when Delhi rolled out the red carpet to welcome Senior General Than Shwe on his six-day visit to the country. With Burma agreeing to help India fight insurgents in the northeast, it does seem that Delhi's quiet courting of the generals is slowly paying off.
General Than Shwe's visit is historic. He is the first head of state from Burma to visit India in 25 years. It has also been a hugely successful visit for both countries. The two sides signed agreements on security, cultural exchanges and hydroelectric power. While India has persuaded Burma to cooperate in tackling insurgents operating in the northeast of the country, Burma's military junta has won a stamp of approval from the world's largest democracy.
India's northeast has the dubious distinction of being home to Asia's longest-running insurgency. There has been a sharp surge in extremist violence in the northeastern states in recent months, particularly in Assam, while anti-India sentiment in Manipur is at an all-time high. In the wake of the surge in extremist violence in the northeast, support from Bangladesh and Burma - countries that share borders with the Indian northeast - has assumed importance. With Bangladesh denying the existence of anti-India militant camps on its territory and unlikely to cooperate with India at this juncture, courting Burma's generals has become all the more important. India needs the military junta's cooperation to ensure that the large number of insurgent outfits operating in the northeast are denied sanctuary in Burma's jungles.
During Than Shwe's visit, the two countries agreed to tackle terrorism jointly. Under the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by Foreign Minister Natwar Singh and Burmese Foreign Minister Nyan Win, both sides have committed to enhancing cooperation against terrorism, arms smuggling, money laundering, drug trafficking, organized crime, international economic crimes and cyber crimes. The mechanism for cooperation includes the exchange of information and personnel, cooperation between law enforcement agencies and joint reviews. An expert consultative group, comprising senior officers, will meet annually to monitor and review the progress of the MoU. Myanmar assured India that it would not allow its territory to be used by insurgent groups pursuing objectives "inimical to Indian interests".
India has offered Burma a number of incentives for cooperation with Delhi. These include an MoU on the Tamanthi hydroelectric project in Burma, agreements on cultural exchanges and the upgrading of rail networks. Delhi has also offered to build more highways in addition to the one it has built between Tamu in Manipur and Mandalay. Above all, India's warm embrace of the visiting general would have provided the military junta with incentive in itself.
Other senior generals, including Maung Aye, have visited the country, but this was a handshake at the highest level between the world's largest democracy and a country that suffers considerable international isolation. Fighting the raging insurgency in its northeastern states, neutralizing China's substantial influence in Burma and growing economic interests in its eastern neighbor prompted India to revise its policy toward Burma a decade ago. Until then India's policy toward Burma was based on support to the struggle for restoration of democracy there. India was among the most vociferous of countries that called on Burma's military government to respect the mandate of the 1990 election in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a sweeping majority. India was therefore reluctant to engage the generals initially.
India's decision to tone down its opposition to Burma's generals and to do business with them led to a quiet engagement.
Cooperation with Burma's generals in fighting militancy is not new. In 1995, for instance, the Indian and Burmese security forces trapped scores of insurgents in a pincer movement along the Mizoram border. In February 2000, the Burmese army cracked down on camps of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) and the United Liberation Front of Assam on its territory.
For those who expected Than Shwe's visit to result in joint counter-insurgency operations, the agreement would have come as a disappointment. But such expectations are unrealistic given that India's ties with the generals are still evolving. There are some who hope that Burma will carry out a Bhutan-like military offensive against the Indian insurgent camps on Burma soil. Late last year, the Royal Bhutan Army cracked down on Bhutan-based camps and hideouts of anti-India insurgents. However, India's relations with Burma are hardly on par with the close ties it has with Bhutan. India does not have with Burma the immense leverage it has with Bhutan. And even in the case of Bhutan, action against the Indian insurgent camps came only when they were seen by the Bhutanese government to be a threat to Bhutan's internal security.
A retired Indian army officer points out that Burma's military junta is in principle not averse to a crackdown against Indian insurgents operating from its territory. However, this might not be practically possible for Burma at this juncture, when its troops are concentrated on the border with Thailand. It simply does not have the requisite numbers to launch counter-insurgency operations against the Indian rebels, he points out.
In the past, India supported the pro-democracy movement in Burma and the pro-democracy activists based on Indian soil to push Burma to respond to its security interests. Delhi's attempts to pressure the generals backfired. For instance, when India awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding to NLD leader and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi in 1993, the generals struck back. They freed scores of Indian rebels in their custody, thus negating the gains of "Operation Golden Bird". When India alleged in December 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists with alleged links with al-Qaeda were in Burma, Rangoon reacted by freeing about 200 militants it had detained the previous month.
Pressuring Burma's generals or rushing them to act against the rebel camps could therefore be counterproductive. Much of the groundwork for enhanced future cooperation has been laid over the years and strengthened by Than Shwe's visit. And India would need to move slowly, nudging the generals to step up cooperation in tackling India's insurgency problem by offering them incentives. That informed opinion in India has come around to accepting the need to engage the generals is evident from the fact that there were fewer protest demonstrations against Than Shwe's visit than those seen in the past when other members of the ruling junta visited India.
In the past, newspaper press editorials would have reminded the government that Burma's military junta has incarcerated that country's elected leader. Last week, the critical voices were muted. India might respect Suu Kyi and want democracy restored in Burma but for now it is willing to do business with the generals. Right now it believes it needs the generals more.