Burma's appointed Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt's recent state visit to China and plans for a visit by the regime's second man, General Maung Aye, to India appear to mark diplomatic victories of the regime despite international diplomatic pressure. At a time when international pressure during the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Indonesia has failed to affect the release of the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and its vice chairman U Tin Oo, the regime faces its neighbours confidently. There is no doubt that the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) is trying to engineer one-way political traffic in the domestic political process while undertaking high level diplomatic engagement within the region.
There is no doubt that the regime has suffered under major financial instability after it armed with a political iron fist with the oppositions. Trouble arises even with China which now demands the payment by Burma of loans and interest. The question remains: with a failing economy and political turmoil, what is the regime's future if internal and external policies remain unchanged?
India, on the other hand, with its new coalition government looks set for a continuation of the policy line of the previous government, especially regarding geopolitics, the Chinese involvement in Burma and India's commercial interest in Burma.
The Burmese regime may hope for good relations with the new Indian government, relations which do not marginalize bilateral ties.
Both Chinese and Indian foreign policies towards Burma are focused mainly on having a major foothold in the country, obtaining market shares and influence on the regime. China provided financial assistance and political support to the regime from the start while India initially rejected the regime's military mission against the pro- democracy movement in late 1980s and early 1990s. However, when the regime remained in power without major disturbance from the opposition forces, the regional super power re-evaluated the weight of its national security concerns and commercial interests.
China is keen on keeping a major share of influence on the regime regardless of international concerns and pressures. Yet while supporting the regime in terms of political stability, the Chinese are reluctant to provide it with a blank check. Thus most bilateral loans from China are not in currency but in hardware and technology, training and infrastructure development. Chinese infrastructure loans and, in the early 1990s, military supplies boosted the morale and strength of the Burmese army in the wake of 1988. Despite the tremendous assistance received from China, Burma's defence budget and spending on other security concerns has tremendously harmed the country's economical and social development and prosperity.
A western diplomat stressed that Yunnan is deeply concerned about how the military regime's political and economic policies might negatively impact upon the bilateral economic relations with China. Major difficulties are bound to arise if the regime persists in refusing political reconciliation with the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. These difficulties would belie the regime's latest propaganda according to which it keeps the state economy in good shape and maintains very good relations with regional countries regardless of international concerns and pressures.
From the Chinese perspective, there is no doubt that Burma needs stability and political and economic development. The Chinese have their own agenda and will not give the appearance of changing adherence to the principle of non-interference in another state's domestic affairs. But the Chinese also warn that Burma needs speedy political reform and democratization. On the other hand, local Chinese businessmen, investors and developers have faced difficulties due to the regime's seasonal policy changes, the uncertainty arising from ever new restrictions and the high levels of corruptions.
Both India and China need to look at Burma's domestic conflict beyond its direct relevance to their official policies. Beijing and New Delhi may now have realized that the solution of a national convention currently on offer and the regime's tougher stance against the NLD do not guarantee the regime's political future.
Sooner or later, when both the Chinese and the Indians have to find their own solutions for how to protect their political and commercial interests in Burma, they will need to be aware that the regime must find a genuine political solution with the NLD. Only such a solution has the potential to ease the both countries' main concern regarding Burma's stability.
Beijing and New Delhi are unlikely to provide full scale economic assistance to Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and to Gen Maung Aye without raising serious questions and concerns. The regime will have to answer these by proposing a political time frame and the outline of a positive reconciliation process. Beijing may expect that the Burmese regime will stay safely in power.
The military regime still considers that China can exert a positive impact on the regime's future stability. At the same time, the regime is trying to deliver a deceptive message of another diplomatic victory- high level state visits to China and India - to the international community and to other regional governments.