Myanmar: The core of India’s ‘look east’ policy
By M. L. Sondhi & Ashok Kapur
The Tribune (India)-13/11/01
FOLLOWING its independence in 1948, Myanmar had a policy of neutralism and isolationism up to the 1980s but when the Myanmar military disallowed Sui Kyi to assume power following the 1990 elections, the country’s external stance changed. Shunned by the Western world and by India on grounds of human rights and democracy, China sensed Myanmar’s isolation and it filled the void by providing almost $ 2 billion worth of military goods and helped with road building and investments.
The international politics of isolating Yangoon enabled China to secure access to Myanmar’s naval facilities and its activities created the prospect that it could emerge as a gateway for the flow of China’s strategic power and political-economic influence into the Bay of Bengal as well as India’s northeast and Bangladesh.
The core of Indian policy during the 1980s and the 1990s remained fixated on the traditional China/Pakistan front where the flow of power and ideas was stalemated. While China was lulling Indians by talk about peaceful coexistence, she was quietly, proactively, building a new and a significant strategic gateway into the Bay of Bengal.
So the challenge to Indian power and prestige in the Indian Ocean area by China was threefold. The first,was to build Pakistan into a strategic gateway for the flow of Chinese influence into the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, Pakistan and Kashmir area. The second was to make Nepal into a buffer zone between India and China and to alter the internal complexion of Nepalese politics by influencing the politics of the Palace (the new king Gyanendra is pro-Chinese). In Chinese calculations, the Pakistan front is a major military and a diplomatic front against India, useful for bleeding India. The porous Nepal-India border could become an active military front against India. Developing Myanmar into a strategic gateway for China is the third leg of Beijing’s long range policy.
Chinese strategy may be described as one of ‘salami tactics’: cut a piece (i.e. make one move) at a time, watch the reaction, and if there is no response, make another move. Interpret silence as consent. The long range strategy and policy is masked by careful tactics. While it plays on Myanmar’s isolation, Beijing is careful enough to emphasise the history of Burmese nationalism and independence in the shadow of India and China. Still, China projects a special relationship with the Burmese. They are ‘brothers born of the same parents’. The subtle message is that Indians are not in the same category. So the strategic purpose is masked by a nice cultural pull.
Compared with the India-China border (a military and diplomatic stalemate), the India-Pakistan conflict system (a situation of manageable instability, with a prospect of a political breakthrough), and the Sino-Pakistani military supply relationship (where Chinese military and diplomatic injections to Pakistan can be countered by the Indian armed forces), the strategic Bay of Bengal-Myanmar-Bangladesh-Indian north eastern nexus is the critical area where new alignments will have an impact on Indian interests and regional and global geopolitics.
How? Internationally, if China’s presence consolidates in the naval sphere, Japan’s oil supply and commerce is threatened; this is why Japan closely follows Myanmar developments. The American interest is even bigger. It relates to the security of the sea-lanes from Japan to Israel through the Taiwan straits, South China seas, the Indonesian archipelago and the Indian Ocean including the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. Regionally, for India, the growth of China’s presence and prestige in any part of this nexus increases China’s attraction as a pole for tribal insurgencies, for the governments and peoples of Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar.
For India, this nexus is the critical centre of gravity in the 21st century, the point of constructive contact between American, Japanese, Australian, Indonesian, Myanmarese and Indian strategy. If this critical mass of Asian and international power is formed now it will not only undermine China’s strategic design in the area but also raise Indian authority in the north eastern part of the Indian Union and the Indian Ocean area. To achieve this, however, Indian practitioners need to form and project a new strategic culture and a new set of institutional arrangements which foster a political-military-affairs interface among Indian civilian and military professionals.
A new Indian strategic culture is needed which is not simply reactive in a crisis, but which indeed is pro-active before a crisis occurs, and seeks to deter hostile action and intent rather than to defend at a time and place of the enemy’s choosing. Also, there is a need to get outside the compartmentalised boxes of the various ministries and to seek interface and teamwork rather than turf protection. At present India’s administrative political culture favours compartmentalisation, turf protection and reactivity, and there are no medals for officials who are ahead of the curve.
Access to Myanmar’s 1930-km long coastline would enhance China’s access to the Indian Ocean, and create a wedge between South and Southeast Asia. If Chinese submarines can berth in Myanmar’s ports, if Chinese facilities can monitor Indian naval communications, and (this is a big if), if Chinese naval vessels can enter the Indian Ocean by establishing a sea-denial, sea-control capacity in the South China seas,China would become a menace to Indian naval communications. The Chinese navy has four targets: Japan, Taiwan, India and obviously the USA. Chinese military writings recognise the importance of sea power in dealing with regional threats from Japan to India. American military writings too recognise this as a long term danger. The cracks should be filled now rather than let grow. There should be an awareness that if China establishes a clear edge in Myanmar as it has in Pakistan, and as it seeks in Nepal, India could lose its attractiveness to her regional neighbours. Prestige or attraction is a halo which revolves around the perception of power and the exercise of influence in practical circumstances. Its basis is psychological. It depends on ‘present power’, not on past experiences. In estimating Indian power and prestige in the Bay of Bengal-north eastern nexus or Southeast Asia, it matters somewhat that India is a military power and has economic strength or that it won in the 1971 war. Present power has to be established point by point as in a game of tennis. The last set is history, so the next point in Indian strategy should relate to the exertion of Indian influences in Myanmar.
Policy paradigms
(i) Drug trade: About 60 per cent of heroin used in the USA comes from the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia which includes Myanmar production. Though the Taliban has apparently stopped poppy production in Afghanistan, the anti-drug war in South America continues.
(ii) The China factor: The target is the United Wa State army, which consists of about 5000 armed and motivated ethnic tribesmen in Shan state in Myanmar who have been given missiles by China. They help build roads that could give China land access to Myanmar ports and to the Indian Ocean for the first time through this area. Here the mix of concern about the drug trade, China’s arms supply to Myanmar and to ethnic tribals and concern with sea-lane security in the future is focusing the American mind on Myanmar. The issue is no longer about human rights and democracy, or it is less so. America is strengthening its alliance ties with Australia, Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN nations (its traditional allies) to engage China with a stronger diplomatic front.
(iii) The Russia factor: Now Russia is back in the Asian geo-political game and its policy includes a buildup of strategic ties with Yangoon. Moscow recently sold a dozen MIG 19s to modernise Myanmar’s decaying airforce which consists of Chinese MIG 21s and MIG 19s. Russia has tried since 1997 to build ties with Myanmar and it is now succeeding. A Myanmar presence is also meant to monitor Chinese activities in Southeast Asia. Moscow’s Myanmar contacts have been facilitated by Russia’s secret service and the cooperation, in addition to intelligence exchange, centres on anti-drugs policy, military cooperation and nuclear energy. For Myanmar, a Russia link is good insurance in the context of the China-India rivalry.
(iv) Indian northeast: India’s Myanmar policy must take into account the proximity of Indian north eastern states to the porous border with Myanmar. Insurgencies and separatist movements in the region involve about 50 groups. The issues involve illegal migration, tribal rivalries, fights over water and economic resources, alienation from Delhi and meddling by Chinese and Pakistani intelligence services. Several groups have found refuge in Myanmar because of a porous border and ethnic links across the border as well as sympathy for secessionist movements by the states in the region.
The future of Indian unity concerns not only Kashmir but more significantly it is inherent in the multifaceted complexity of the sources of instability in the northeast. The region has many players the seven provinces in the Indian northeast with complex problems, three states in different state of alienation from Delhi (Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan), two with interventionist policies (China and Pakistan), one with an interventionist potential which is on a manageable scale (Myanmar).
There has to be an identification in the Indian mind about the constant connection between internal unity and democracy, between internal and international politics, and between economic and military security. There must also be an awareness that the Bay of Bengal and the associated region is the major front for India in the 21st century. The old fronts "Pakistan and the Himalayan area with China" are still important, but there the strategic imperative is to hold the line and seek a diplomatic breakthrough with Pakistan. (A China settlement is far away until Beijing has a worked through its current leaders who are haughty and subversive and play games with India).
The Bay of Bengal region is resource rich, and it is the point of contact between Indian, Chinese, American, Indonesian, Myanmarese, Bangladeshi, Australian and powers. Here lies a critical point of engagement and friction between many major and minor powers in the world today.
The Prime Minister needs to function as a coalition builder, a coalition statesman, who should take the lead with world leaders in building the Bay of Bengal area as a stable and developing community rather than as a centre of international tension. But the approach will need to be built on the principles of coercive diplomacy, not on empty peace slogans.
(v) Myanmar situation: The international debate about Myanmar has revolved around a single personality (Sui Kyi), and three issues: human rights, the lack of Burmese democracy, and the dominance of the military. However, the parameters of the debate should be revisited for a number of reasons.
Human rights and human security are important but so is national survival and national security. China, Pakistan, India, the USA all take a strategic view of human rights. The selective use of human rights one standard for Kosovo and another for Rwanda shows that human rights diplomacy is driven by considerations of national interests and not moral principles.
The other two issues democracy and the role of the military can also be reframed in the context of the USA’s attitude towards China and Pakistan. The USA has no problem in engaging China despite its authoritarianism and repressive policies and the lack of democracy as we understand the term. The reason, concrete economic and strategic interests are involved.
What India must do?:
br> China has a significant presence in Myanmar but India has an opportunity to shape a policy that takes into account the core issues of the vitality of Burmese nationalism, Myanmar’s desire to build its India links in significant ways, and the danger of Chinese strategic ambitions particularly in the naval area. If Musharraf is a potential Indian strategic partner, so are members of the Burmese military. But to build a realistic and strong connection the following elements must be recognised and countered.
China has already provided $ 2 billion in military aid plus economic aid, factory construction and road building. China has considerable investments in Myanmar. Chinese immigration into Myanmar is extensive.However, Myanmar is not a Chinese satellite. A positive view of the thinking of the Burmese military is warranted. It is the core of Burmese nationalism and it has successfully met the challenge from Burmese communists. The military has also brought most dissident tribals inside the Burmese tent.
Russian MIG 29s will help modernise Myanmar’s forces and reduce dependence on China. The military is open to enhanced Indian trade, road building works.
The common denominator is that the Burmese military is not against India, it can act in a neutral and an independent way, and its China relationship will not be allowed to gain an anti-India character if India builds substantial ties with Myanmar. Myanmar turned to China because of the policy of isolating it in the late 1980s and this led to enhanced naval cooperation. Once it is no longer isolated the strength of Burmese nationalism could change its external relations.
If India wants to be taken seriously as an Asian force, it should actively pursue its various economic and strategic issues in the Bay of Bengal and Myanmar areas. They should become the intellectual and the geo-political core of India’s "look east" policy, and India needs to link the issue of unity in the northeast with the issue of stability and growth free from external hegemony in the area. To get its China policy right, Indians should recognise the difference between China and India.
India should make its sea power a tool of coercive diplomacy, deterrence and combat in war. The Andamans is already a major naval facility like Visakhapatnam and Mumbai. Make it a symbol of India’s commitment to develop the Bay of Bengal and the entire region as the new frontier of Indian strategy. In doing so, the look east policy would have a firm naval and intellectual anchor. Otherwise, if Chinese submarines freely enter the Bay of Bengal, this area will show as a big hole in the Indian strategy.
India needs to develop a consciousness about different diplomatic-military fronts in its strategic environment and the military missions in each case. In the Indo-Pakistan-Kashmir-China-Afghanistan front the nodal agencies are the Indian army and the airforce but in a war situation (1971 and Kargil) the navy has a responsibility to bottle up Karachi by deploying its missiles, and Indian tanks would have a role along the lines of Brasstacks exercise in Sind. (China and Pakistan are framing an answer by developing Gwador, and this too will require the application of Indian sea-power and knowledge about Chinese and Pakistani aims.) In the Himalayan area the Army and Airforce along with missile formations are the nodal services which are tasked to manage China’s strategic threat in a war situation.
In the Bay of Bengal, the Navy is the main nodal agency to deter and to fight if necessary. Indian political aims must, therefore, reflect the strategic requirements of a volatile region, where the language of geo-politics rather than peace and friendship makes sense. The language must acquire a strategic calculus.
This requires a sea change in the Indian mind rejecting defence (fighting at a time and place of enemy choosing) and embracing deterrence where pro-activity is necessary. The pro-activity must be based, first, on Indian values and interests of which unity and nationalism are the core in Indian social and political thought; and secondly, on existing circumstances which favour coalition building between India, Myanmar, the USA and Japan. It needs a strong focus on the sea-lanes and on China.
Prof M. L. Sondhi is Co-Chairperson, Centre for the Study of National Security, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Prof Ashok Kapur is Chairman, Department of Political Science, Waterloo University, Canada.