In early April, the United States sent an envoy - director of the Office for Mainland Southeast Asia Stephen Blake - to Burma, the first such visit in seven years. In the same month, US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg said Washington hoped to develop a common strategy with other Asian countries to help bring Burma out of isolation.
Such steps would have been unheard of during the George W Bush administration, which during its two terms took a hostile policy towards Burma and pressurized it to start a process of democratization.
It seems the administration of President Barack Obama is quietly changing his predecessor's policy, both towards Burma and other nations in what Bush called the "axis of evil" - Iran, Iraq and North Korea. For example, the White House recently expressed intent to start dialogue with Tehran and strengthen links with Pyongyang through the six-party framework. It has also dispatched congressmen to visit Cuba.
At first glance, it seems strange Obama would change his predecessor's foreign polices so radically and so quickly, but this is all part of the new administration's strategy. Under Obama, foreign policy will aim at proactively strengthening international legitimacy and soft power - or "smart power" as characterized by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton - that was depleted under the Bush administration.
Obama is pushing the pendulum of US foreign relations in another direction, to consolidate a global leadership role severely weakened under Bush, particularly by the 2003 invasion of Iraq. All signs are that Washington wants to resume its status of benign hegemony in the post-Bush era.
Against such a background, it's easy to understand Obama's new policy toward Burma, which is also an attempt to regain US influence in Burma lost since the end of the Vietnam War in the mid-1970s.
In a geopolitical sense, the Obama administration's plans will pose a challenge to the existing balance of power in Southeast Asia, and its policy will attract attention from some countries, especially Burma's neighboring powers like China and India. In other words, the US's new Burma policy will not only boost the US's image in the world but also alter the current geopolitical pattern in the region, provided Washington can carry out this new policy consistently and successfully.
In recent years, the US has been engaged in a war against terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and elsewhere. It took a hostile policy towards Burma, pressing it on human-rights issues, democratization and the release of dissidents. But the US achieved virtually nothing with these policies of containment, which are generally ineffective at bringing isolated countries to their knees. Washington sneered at economic cooperation with Burma and refused economic aid to the country, as the Bush administration viewed Burma as a dictatorial regime.
China took advantage of the situation to cultivate closer economic ties with Burma, which inevitably underpinned improved political relations. Interdependent relations now are the reality both for China and for Burma. With the development of these relations, China's influence in Burma has increased remarkably.
At first glance, the US's attempt to resume its influence in this country could pose a challenge to China, that could reduce or even end the Middle Kingdom's influence there.
Geopolitical competition by big powers seems a very possible future for Southeast Asia, which is not good news for the countries in the region. Whatever happens, China is unlikely to withdraw from Burma because it has already developed very deep economic relations with it. China needs Burma's raw materials, and more importantly needs its ports to transport goods to other countries in Africa and Middle East.
On the surface, Washington's new policy to engage Burma could create a geopolitical rivalry that could easily lead to regional conflict. But this is not the whole or true picture of international politics in this region. Before analyzing the consequence of new US policy for Burma, a question should be asked: How will the US engage Burma?
Firstly, the US could seek direct dialogue with Burma's leaders and ask it to start democratization in exchange for economic or even political support among the international community. But this approach will not be easy to put into practice, as it is similar to policies of containment. Burma will not reform its political system according to a timetable set by Washington or discuss its domestic political affairs with the US.
Secondly, the US could engage Burma's major opposition party, the National League for Democracy, and dissidents who want to see the current military regime overthrown. Frankly, such "engagement" is nothing new, as all previous US administrations including the Bush administration tried that - sometimes even through the Central Intelligence Agency. This approach is no better than the first and has proved ineffective.
The third alternative for the US is to engage with Burma through economic cooperation or financial aid. However, the US imposes preconditions on aid or economic ties when dealing with developing nations. Burma has other sources of economic support, for example from China, so it will never accept conditional US aid. Economic cooperation without political conditions are not possible for the US and do not fit with the primitive aims of the US's new Burma policy. Steinberg has clearly stated that the core target of US policy toward Burma will not change. The US hopes Burma becomes "more open", can respect human rights and incorporate itself into global economy.
The US will quickly find it is difficult to engage Burma. So at this moment China is not worried about the US's seemingly rapid penetration of the Southeast Asian region. Although possible, geopolitical competition is not imminent. Out of its own strategic concerns, China would not welcome US engagement in Burma as a hegemonic power trying to dictate to Burma on political affairs, as this could result in domestic unrest in Burma that could threaten regional stability.
However, China would welcome economic or trade engagements by the US in Burma. A prosperous Burma with social stability fits Chinese interests and those of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Economic achievements in Burma helped by US support could benefit ASEAN unity. A united and efficient ASEAN can keep regional stability, which China would welcome.
In consideration of this, China can hardly oppose any positive US engagement in Burma, what China is against is any US tactics that would interfere in Burma's internal affairs and lead to regional instability. Additionally, the US should recognize the fact that China is an important actor in Southeast Asia when it plans its engagement policy in Burma, and the US would face great difficulty if it tried to exclude China from its new Burma policy.
The US should not attempt to try a six-party mechanism in its engagement with Burma. China, Burma and perhaps ASEAN will refuse this suggestion, although Steinberg voiced this idea several days ago. Burma is not North Korea, and is not threatening any country. Burma is not an issue for the international community, so it's not necessary to discuss Burma in a multilateral framework.
It will not be easy for the US to successfully engage in Burma if it tries the obsolete approaches used by Bush. China will never welcome that. But Beijing will be happy if the US can engage in Burma as a pure business partner. Essentially, the success or failure of US engagement in Burma does not depend on other countries' attitudes but on its own approach.