Burma is a thorn in Asean's side

Abdullah Al Madani
Gulf News, UAE
January 21, 2007

It seems that the membership of military-ruled Burma in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) has turned to be a thorn in the organisation's side, damaging its credibility and global image.

The founding members of Asean, namely Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, have long advocated the idea that by including Burma into the organisation and upgrading the country's miserable economy they could contain its brutal regime and help the national reconciliation process.

This was strongly opposed by the Americans and their Western allies who distrusted Burma's military junta, saying that the inclusion would only prolong the regime's survival, give it legitimacy, and end its isolation.

Developments since 1997, the year in which Burma joined the organisation as a full member, have proved that Washington was right.

Asean has failed to convince Rangoon to move on a roadmap to democracy, stop targeting ethnic minorities, and release political prisoners, including Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.

This was largely attributed to splits in the grouping, which has long prided itself on consensus and observed the principle of non-interference.

In the last two years, the Burmese ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) not only continued its brutal policies but proved to be one of the region's most ruthless regimes.

Reports released by several independent organisations and based on testimonies of local civilians and relief workers have talked about systematic campaigns by Burma's army to force the civilian population and ethnic insurgent groups out of the country's central and northern regions into border areas by attacking their food supplies, burning their villages, destroying their fields and rice stores, and severing them from sources of intelligence and funds.

Dissatisfaction

As a result, there have been dramatic increases in the numbers of villagers fleeing across the border into refugee camps in Thailand, which currently hosts nearly 150,000 people.

Having been embarrassed by these developments, and in an attempt to express its dissatisfaction, Asean forced Rangoon in July 2005 to agree to forego its turn for the rotating chairmanship of the grouping in 2006.

Additionally, it made Burma agree to receive Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar as an Asean special envoy for discussion on political reforms.

Albar's visit to Rangoon in 2006, however, was a total failure as he neither could meet the SPDC's head General Than Shwe, nor the opposition - under house arrest - leader Suu Kyi.

This has clearly shown Rangoon's ignorance and unwillingness to cooperate. It also has exposed Asean's limited power to deal with a case in which a member state becomes a cause for embarrassment to the bloc.

In fact, Asean Secretary-General Ong Keng Yeng overtly talked about this in April 2006 when he said that the bloc had limited leverage to pressurise Burma's military junta, adding that the help of China and India in this regard would be significant, given the two Asian giants' multi-dimensional ties with Burma.

But it would be difficult to expect them to twist Rangoon's arm as each of them has a different agenda and seek more influence.

With the aforementioned retrograding developments, the Americans could not wait longer, something that led them this month to sponsor a draft resolution at the UN Security Council that called Burma to free all detainees, release Suu Kyi, respect human rights and move towards democracy and national reconciliation.

The resolution, which was proposed on the grounds that the political and human rights climate in Burma was a threat to regional peace and global security, did not pass because both China and Russia used their veto power to block it.

Their stance can be viewed from different angles. In addition to their traditional policy of blocking any resolution that might serve Washington and increase its influence in areas considered to be their own backyards, both countries have never shown any concern about human rights or political reforms in the Third World.

In fact, by defeating the resolution on Burma they blocked the establishment of a precedent that might be used as a basis for discussing political reforms in China or human rights in Chechnya.

Moreover, Russia vetoed the resolution because of its concern about sustaining economic and military cooperation with Rangoon that has grown since a rare visit to Moscow in April 2006 by General Maung Aye, the No 2 in the ruling SPDC. Similarly, China wanted to protect its massive interests in Burma.

For Washington, the blocking of the resolution was not totally a defeat. By forwarding such a draft resolution, it has succeeded, at least, in pushing Asean to escalate pressure on Burma and to draft rules - for the first times since its creation in 1967 - that could allow censure or expulsion of members and alter its policy of non-interference in member states' affairs.

Dr Abdullah Al Madani is an academic researcher and lecturer on Asian affairs.