Who would have expected Thailand to have the courage to toughen its position towards Burma now, especially when there is no sense of foreign policy direction at all?
Bangkok's desire to send a strong message to the Pyinmana regime that this eastern neighbour will no longer give carte blanche support unless the junta leaders heed peer advice and change accordingly grows stronger by the day. Like Thailand, more and more Asean countries are losing the will to defend the regime.
Last week, Foreign Minister Kantathi Suphamongkhon renewed his call - the second time in a month - for more tangible reforms in Burma. He also appealed for the United Nations to play a bigger role in ending the impasse in Burma.
Thailand's international reputation has been battered by its support of Burma after the Thaksin Shinawatra government came to power. It was able to muddle through with this policy as other Asean members were also on the same wavelength regarding the necessity of defending their pariah member.
However, with Asean celebrating its 40th anniversary next year in Singapore, the grouping wants a fresh start on Burma. After seven years of tireless effort, Burma has proved one thing to Asean: it does not care a hoot about the grouping. In fact, Pyinmana pays more attention to China and India because of their strategic location and trade-off value.
The mission to Burma in March by Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar demonstrated the regime's disregard for Asean's pleas. As a result, key Asean members now prefer to seek more engagement from the United Nations, a far cry from the past policy of defending Burma in the world body. But a broader consensus has yet to be reached.
Following last year's painstaking diplomatic manoeuvring to place the Burma issue on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council, the international community has once again got to grips with the real situation in Burma and the fate of Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace laureate. The extension of her detention at the end of May generated widespread condemnation and increased support for her release and that of the junta's other political prisoners. Last week, members of parliament from 35 countries also weighed in with their concerns and urged the council to take up the Burma issue.
Since the junta seized power and crushed the pro-democracy movement in 1988, there has never been a time such as this when the combined support of the international community is so strong. After 15 years of mundane deliberations in the UN General Assembly, the informal briefing on the Burma situation in the Security Council last December that followed the release of the Tutu-Havel report on the situation in the country effectively pushed the topic up several notches on the UN agenda.
The additional briefing given by Ibrahim Gambari, the UN under-secretary for political affairs, on the outcome of his visit to Burma and meeting with Suu Kyi in May also raised the urgency of the matter.
The ongoing effort by the US and its Western allies to put Burma on the Security Council's agenda is a long-term process to highlight the threat the country poses to peace and international stability. Unfortunately, Asean members have not yet highlighted these salient points, simply out of concern that it might jeopardise their fellow member.
At the moment this collective sympathy for Burma has largely evaporated, particularly among the grouping's core members. The higher the profile of the Burma issue in the UN scheme of things, the greater the pressure Burma has to bear. And the same goes for Asean.
So far, this concerted campaign has generated two positive effects.
First, Asean members are bridging the gap in the perception of the Burma issue. They want to involve the UN more in finding a solution. Certainly, this has to do with saving their own reputations at UN platforms, as they have been embarrassed by Burma's continued intransigence.
Malaysia's latest comment is indicative of the grouping's negative sentiment. For the first time the Asean chairman has urged the UN Security Council to debate the issue officially. If there is no positive response from Burma, this position could slowly turn into an Asean consensus. But newer Asean members want to give Burma more time and have urged their colleagues to send another fact-finding mission to Burma.
Second, with Asean now calling for a Security Council debate, China's current support of Burma will be put under the microscope. For decades, with the help of Russia, China has vetoed any attempt to debate Burma officially at the council. Previously, Asean and China saw eye to eye - that the Burma crisis was an internal and Asian problem that should be handled and solved by Asians without any internationalisation.
That commonality is wearing thin. As Asean and China go different ways on the role of the UN in the issue, it will be interesting to see how China conducts itself. Will Beijing continue to back Burma and block efforts to debate it at the council level? Or, could Beijing turn into a Good Samaritan and assume its international role to influence Burma, as it did with North Korea to revive the six-party talks?
Asean's core members hope that China's growing global status and responsibility will help and eventually bring it to address the Burma issue seriously and with the regional interests at heart. In the long run, China has to show that its Burmese policy is not self-serving. Otherwise, this could become a source of conflict with Asean as it would weaken the grouping's calls to the UN and jeopardise Asean-China relations.
Of course, as far as China is concerned, Burma is not yet a do-or-die issue. But it's obvious that Beijing no longer has the luxury of benign neglect. If unheeded over the long term, China could end up opposite Asean over Burma.
Asean's expectations of China are extremely high at this point, as both sides are celebrating the 15th anniversary of their relations with a summit meeting in Nanning in October. Realistically or not, they hope that, when push comes to shove, China will favour their common stance rather than Burma's. In case of a shift in China's policy, then India will be the next target.