It is not only the region, but the world that is faced with the challenge of how to bring an end to the continuing oppression of the people of Burma by the military junta. If the world is really focused on an overall political, and therefore peaceful, solution, it is important that the many aspects of the problem be considered. It should not be based solely on an emotional but reaction to the horror of the bloodbath that followed the recent peaceful demonstrations led by the monks, the symbol of the country's moral authority.
History is one factor. The military has fought insurgencies by the minorities since independence in 1948. They have been of the view that British colonialism left behind a time-bomb by giving minorities the right to self-determination after 10 years. The Burmese, consisting more than 60 percent of the populace, are the largest ethnic group and are not ready to share power with the minorities. The military has become the only national institution with the mission to overcome instabilities. But they have achieved this by using brute force, the only language they have known for the last 50 years or so.
Under international and regional pressure, the military has tried to get a plan moving by formulating a "roadmap to democracy", which thus far lacks credibility because the opposition parties, the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, are not party to this process. The opposition itself is divided, including amongst the minorities, and the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi has never been tested.
Thus, while it is easy to think about getting rid of the military, their departure might create a vacuum of power that could lead to renewed civil war, as happened from independence until about 10 years ago, when ceasefires were signed between most of the minorities and the military. However, because there were no peace agreements, the minorities have all kept their weapons. The ceasefires are fragile.
The strategic environment of Burma is another factor that has to be recognized in looking for a political solution. ASEAN still believes that engagement might result in change in Burma. The West, on the other hand, has repeatedly called for sanctions on Burma. The strategies of ASEAN and of the West have not been successful.
ASEAN's policy of engagement has not been implemented fully or consistently and ASEAN has never really been hands on. The West also has been inconsistent in applying its policy. Japan has recently taken a more active stance. On the other hand, until recently China and India refused to cooperate with ASEAN, and instead stressed their strategic and economic interests above everything else in their relationship with Burma.
The recent clash was less brutal than that of 1988. The clampdown has stopped the protest, but only for a while, and more will come as the economic situation continues to worsen. Whatever the junta tries to do, without economic improvement they will not be able to hold on to power in the medium term. Moreover, the people despise the junta.
Today the international community is more willing to move and to support efforts towards a resolution, because the clash and clampdown are unacceptable. The international community is also more ready to cooperate despite some differences and nuances in responding to the events due to real politics. The people in Myanmar as well as the international community are no longer willing to accept business as usual for Burma.
The UN Security Council and UN Secretary General have started to move, and they should continue their initiative together with other stakeholders. It is very appropriate that they try to develop a consensus among the stakeholders. ASEAN has been weak in its leadership and has not been united on this matter. The U.S. and the EU have opted to apply sanctions without thinking it through, while China will not take an active stance because it has too many interests there that could be compromised. India, which has been a disappointment for ASEAN as the leading democracy in East Asia, has no intention of doing anything except balancing China's strategic interest and energy needs.
What should and can be done? First, all stakeholders must be united in looking for a solution, at least on the basic elements of the plan for a peaceful transition to democracy. The immediate step is to push for a dialog between the junta and the NLD under Aung San Suu Kyi (who should be released from detention). This will not be easy, but an opening has been made by the UN Secretary General's special advisor, Gambari, during his recent mission to Burma. This is a real opening as the junta has appointed an interlocutor, but it must be followed up by actions.
A new roadmap has to be negotiated between all parties including the opposition and the minorities, and with the support of all international stakeholders. It should include a transition period where a sharing of power should be organized between the military and the civilian opposition, including the minorities.
A constitution should be formulated during that period. The constitution should guarantee the rights of the minorities. General elections will follow after a reasonable period of preparation. There should be agreement on the continued role of the military in politics for a certain period. In the meantime, the military should be reformed and put under democratic control after a permanent government is installed. Some selective amnesty could be entertained for the military leaders. The exiled elite could come back in the transition period and assist in the implementation of the roadmap.
The plan should be guaranteed by the UNSC and other stakeholders, especially ASEAN, Japan and the EU as well as India. The economic component of the plan is critical. The international community should provide adequate and long-term support as an inducement for the resolution. This is the right momentum to start and implement the roadmap.
What about the junta? Could and would they be willing to compromise? This would depend on how strong the coalition under the Security Council's permanent members is going to be. Equally important is the approach taken. It will have to include a mix of carrots and sticks as sanctions alone will not work. Unity and the firm hand of the coalition will be needed if the junta refuses to compromise.
How about Aung San Suu Kyi? She is a mighty political and moral symbol, but is known to be very stubborn and has limited experience in governing. She might want to reach out to many minority groups, but this has not happened thus far because of the limitations imposed by the junta. She has had sufficient time to think about Myanmar's future and her role in it. Since she is smart, she will realize that besides adhering to basic principles she needs to be flexible. It is not impossible that she is willing to compromise.
In supporting the UN good offices mission, Indonesia could begin to devise a plan to facilitate a process that could lead to a viable compromise amongst the relevant parties in Myanmar. This could begin with an effort to bring together the international stakeholders, ASEAN, Japan, China, the U.S., the EU and India, for a serious exchange. Why not an informal meeting in Jakarta in early 2008?
The writer is vice chairman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies' Board of Trustees in Jakarta.