The world is looking to Burma’s neighbours, the Association of South East Asian Nations, India and China to take the lead in pressing the insular, defiant Burmese military regime to accept the United Nations’ call for genuine dialogue with its political opposition. Any talks should begin with Aung San Suu Kyi, the detained opposition leader, and should address the underlying economic and social conditions that triggered the Saffron Revolution of August and September.
The greatest expectations, however, ride on China, which shares a 1,400-mile border with Burma, has growing economic interests in the country and has until now shielded its regime from international action. Does China really have leverage over Burma’s generals and, if so, will Beijing use it to press for political transition and reform in the country?
To answer that question we must first bear in mind that China and Burma have a troubled history, most recently during the Cultural Revolution when China supported serious communist insurgencies in Burma. The generals who rule Burma today cut their teeth fighting against these insurgencies and are still deeply suspicious of Chinese designs on their country. Thus Beijing must tread very carefully in presuming to advise the Burmese generals on how to manage their internal affairs, for fear that it could only make them more intransigent.
Second, China must also consider its interests in harnessing Burmese energy and raw materials to the development of its economically backward province of Yunnan, for which they have a development programme stretching out at least 30 years.
To protect these interests over the long term, Beijing must balance its support for the current regime with the prospects for maintaining good relations with a future civilian democratic government in Burma. It must be careful not to foster resentment among the Burmese public that might turn into violence against the large Chinese immigrant population in Burma, as it has in the past. Thus Beijing must find ways to reach out to opposition democracy forces in Burma and help the international community to protect them.
Third, Beijing must be mindful of how its support for democratic transition and dialogue with the opposition in Burma will be perceived by its own dissidents. Can Chinese officials rationalise their dissatisfaction with incompetent military governance in Burma to justify support for democratisation in Burma without inviting questions about supporting democratisation in China? In other words, can they argue convincingly to a Chinese audience that political transition in the Burmese context is necessary not for the sake of democratisation, but to prevent the military government from destroying the country?
And finally, Beijing must consider China’s image as a rising world power, where it will be increasingly expected to act responsibly. If China can take a more politically responsible role in Sudan, it cannot afford to ignore the behaviour of its close neighbour to the south west. The Burmese regime’s latest travesties, carried out in memorable colour as the world watched, appear to have left Beijing with no alternative but to join the world in condemning the generals and supporting UN calls for dialogue and political transition in Burma. This is a big step for China and a calculated risk at home.
While Beijing is undoubtedly disgusted with the generals’ performance both politically and economically, it is unlikely to act unilaterally to bring them into line. Rather, Chinese leaders will find it more attractive to keep the UN in the lead, supporting its efforts to press the Burmese regime into genuine dialogue and political reform, but working at the same time to moderate the language of UN statements and resolutions, as they have recently in the UN Security Council and the Human Rights Council.
They will also work to facilitate UN access to the generals, as they did with Ibrahim Gambari, the UN secretary-general’s special adviser, in September. But they will not support harsh action against the regime and will carefully modulate their own public pronouncements, as much to protect themselves at home as to save face for their Burmese clients.
The human tragedy the generals have created in Burma is a true conundrum for China that will seriously test its diplomacy over the coming months. If the UN effort bears fruit and a negotiated transition gets under way in Burma, China can legitimately expect to share the rewards.
However, if the UN fails to move the generals into dialogue with the opposition and the Burmese regime proceeds defiantly to force its own military constitution on the country, China will inevitably share the blame, both inside Burma and in the eyes of the international community.
The writer was US chargé d’affaires in Burma from 1999 to 2002