Will there be a real transition in Burma?
By Hre Mang
Mizzima News - March 4, 2002
A regime change in Burma is unlikely to take place soon. The potential for transition is vested in political transformation monitored by the regime in compromise with the opposition and under agreed exit guarantees and the promise of an adequate political role in future government for army personnel.
After more than a decade of struggle, there is no clue as to the overthrow of the military government, and it is anyone's guess what kind of political transition may be likely to take place in Burma. The military government's first attempt at distracting attention from demands for political transition, the multi-party national elections of 1990, deceived and misled many democratic activists and supporters.
The second attempt, the so-called covert dialogue, which has been taking place since October 2000 offers the military government an effective political strategy to persuade the international community for its ultimate commitment and to distract democratic activists. It still remains unknown how political transition is going to take place in Burma and what form it will take.
Enthusiastic student activists have dispersed throughout the world and fragmented into multiple parties and organizations, and some even have become professionals. The future of the exiled government run by the 1990 MP-elects is uncertain while its political approach has been ineffective, not strong enough to overthrow the military government. The international community's attitude towards the Burmese military government was moderated by its subtle way of dealing with ethnic insurgencies, the so-called "Armed Peace," its covert talks with the opposition leader Daw Suu, and by its release of some political prisoners.
Where does the future of Burma's political transition lie?
Compared to the immediacy of the student force after 1988, the strength of Burma's student activists has been dispersed into many different parties and organizations around the world. Cease-fires in many instances of ethnic insurgency have been negotiated by the military government, including with one of the strongest groups, the Kachin Independent Organization (KIO). The KNU had been facing usual internal factionalism. Armed groups do not command enough power to overthrow the military government in absence of a supporting military intervention by the international community. Armed struggles in Burma have almost been cracked down almost entirely by the military government.
The importance of Burma in the Asian regional politics has increased, especially among the Asian super powers, China, India and Japan. China, which shares with Burma a history of cracking down on student activists and of accusations of human rights violations, seems willing to protect the Burmese military government if necessary. China has become Burma's economic and military backbone, especially after 1990 and after the collapse of the Burma Communist Movement. China's role in Burma's political transition is very important, not only because of its status as a regional power but also because of its veto power in the UN. Without the consent of China, the United Nations is unlikely to be able to take any effective action in Burma.
The UN envoy's and delegates' intervention merely publicizes the regime's political deals and gives the regime an opportunity to underscore its international legitimacy as though it did in fact intend true political transition from a military to civilian government.
India, with its internal insurgency problems in the northeastern region and with fear and jealousy of China's advantage in relations with Burma, has started to make a positive gesture and deal with the Burma military government. On the military level, Burmese and Indian soldiers conducted several joint counter-insurgency operations along the Indo-Burma border in order to tackle Indian ethnic insurgencies and Burmese democratic fighters. India is enthusiastic about building a cross-border trade road, connecting regions inside Burma with Moreh in Maipur and Champhai in Mizoram. India's contribution to the progress of Burma's democratization is thus unlikely to weaken the regime, which on the contrary, is strengthened militarily and economically by India's constructive engagement.
At the same time, Japan, which is unwilling to yield the Burmese market to China, has interacted with the military government on the issue of humanitarian assistance. Thailand, on the other hand, traditionally an uncomfortable neighbour, shows little interest in Burma's internal politics, with the exception of domestic problems created by Burmese refugees in the country. Singapore has been one of the countries extending much support to the military government, without much concern for the Burma's internal politics, as a faithful neighbour holding up the "no interference to others' domestic problems and peaceful co-existence" policy.
The impression this picture gives is that there is little political pressure from Burma's neighbours towards its timely political transition from military rule to civilian government. In absence of the corporation of the Asian neighbouring countries, however, effective pressure on the regime by means of economic sanctions looks unlikely.
Asia's regional organizations ASEAN, APEC and ADB, are much less institutionalized and politicized than their western counterparts like NATO. Their constructive dealing with the military government will only, within a limited capacity, help to liberalize it. Overall, the Burmese military government does not encounter any potential threat either politically or economically in its regional context. The absence of such threats makes western pressure grow ineffective, too.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a non-violent democratic leader, without any public information about her covert talks with the Military government since 2000, has to liberalize her stand for a persuasive manner as the only possible way for political transition.
As the Burmese public has been excluded from politics for more than four decades, the role of civil society in the potential political transition is negligible at this time. It is for this reason that civil disobedience in a bid to overthrow the military government after the 1988 example is unlikely to take place. Unlike the example set by other countries' political transformation from military regime to civilian government, the Burma military government will not voluntarily give up political power and return to the barracks.
The Burmese military regime, unlike the ones in Argentina, Greece, and Panama, is unlikely to collapse by itself very soon, having sustained itself through four decades of experience.
After the experience of the 1988 massacre, civil disobedience is unlikely to take place (although it can happen at any time) as the military government has proven its tactics of brutal oppression towards any act of civil disobedience. Moreover, there seems no sign for fraction within the army in the near future as internal cleansing has taken place. The Burmese government, one of the world's most brutal regimes will not give up power for economic reasons inspite of its citizens' economic starvation.
Generally, many countries' political transitions from dictatorship, monarchy and military regime to civil government took place under conditions of internal collapse within the regime, balanced political power on the opposition side, with support of international intervention. After receiving proof of public disapproval since 1988, the current Burmese military regime does not claim to have a legitimate political role. Rather, it has been playing games to legitimize the military's political role based on its claim regarding nationalism, national peace and security.
While the regime is unlikely to give up political power voluntarily, the only scenario for transition is transformation in which the military regime will monitor and design the future government with exit guarantees for its personnel.
Should this scenario not come about, "people power", the mass mobilization of outraged citizens, is necessary to press demands for political transition. It is obvious to the regime that among the people of Burma, there is no ideological confusion over democracy and dictatorship.
The regime has stopped to impugn Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her democratic ideology. On the other hand, it has tried to influence the people with its nationalism, anti-colonialism, anti-Westernism and with the importance of the military's historic political stance for the peace and security of the people in Burmese politics.
The military leaders' understanding of democracy within the Burmese social, cultural and political context is much different from that espoused by Western democracy. Besides power competition, there exist incompatible ideological differences between the military leaders and the opposition.
Therefore, while there has been no balanced political power between the regime government and the opposition, only when there is a compromise from the opposition, the regime government is likely to proceed with political transformation (not replacement) in which body (for example an interim government) both the military leaders and the opposition will share power.