Burma's nuke wish needs response

Kavi Chongkittavorn
The Nation
June 14, 2010

U.S. Senator James Webb, Chairman of the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, abruptly postponed his visit to Burma on June 3 — only a few hours before his scheduled flight—after learning of a report about Burma's nuclear ambition.

It was a bad time to do that, he said, due to new allegations the Rangoon junta leaders were collaborating with Pyongyang to develop a nuclear program. A few days ago, after his return to the U.S., Scot Marciel, ASEAN ambassador said that if the allegation is true, it would impact on the stability and security in the region.

Webb would not take such a drastic step if he just ignored the report produced by Norway-based Democratic Voice of Burma through Aljazeera that alleged Burma is moving toward nuclear technology. Since last August, he has miraculously widened the U.S. engagement with Burma and created storms of controversies following the first high-level visit by any U.S. political figure. He has always hoped to bring peaceful changes and prosperity to Burma as he once did in Vietnam.

However, the 10-month intensified dialogues and contacts between the U.S. and Burma, symbolized by the two trips of Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, have not yet produced breakthroughs or the kind of regime that the U.S. or the international community would like to see — a regime that promises an inclusive, free and fair election with creditable international polls monitoring. Equally important on the U.S. agenda is to ensure that there is no violation of the U.N. Security Resolution 1874 that imposes sanctions against North Korea. Indeed, these endeavors have actually turned to continued frustration.

Worse is the prospect of stronger Burma-North Korea relations. Both are rogue states, which used to be enemies for the past 23 years. Now they are each other's best friends amid growing international isolation and tightening economic sanctions. Thanks to Pyongyang's willingness and foreign-exchanges need, Burma's nuclear confidence has shot up that one day it would have the kind of bargaining power enjoyed by other nuclear aspirants.

After decades of complacency, the Thai security apparatus, especially the National Security Council (NSC), have finally paid more attention to its long-standing assumption that Burma does not and will not have the capacity to assemble a nuclear bomb. The main argument was very simplistic — Burma is poor and backward so it is highly impossible for the country to embark on the project. In addition, persons familiar with the NSC analyses on Burma would immediately recognize the narrative pattern of “appeasement” and “don't rock the boat” syndrome in handling this Western neighbor.

The often cited justifications are fragile security along the porous 2004 kilometers border and Thailand's growing dependency on natural gas from Gulf of Martaban. Last year, the Foreign Ministry asked energy-related agencies and their top decision-makers to come up with policy options to reduce energy needs from Burma and other neighbors. So far, they have not yet done it arguing much was at stake as a lump sum of money have been invested already in the natural-gas related development projects with Burma. Thailand imports an estimate of US$880-million worth of energy from Burma annually. From their vantage point, preservation of status quo at any cost is desirable fearing the country's future energy security would be compromised.

Additional problem is the deep-rooted fear of Burma's aggression (what the Burmese generals can and willing to do against the country and its people). Anytime the word “Pha-mah” — meaning Burma in Thai — is mentioned to ordinary Thais, not to mention the authorities, they would go hysterical with negative comments and endless condemnation. It immediately would conjure up the heartless burning of Ayuthya, which took place in 1774 — some 236 years ago. However, to the Thais the total annihilation of the Siamese capital is as vivid as before with the aid of numerous historical books, dramas, folk tales and words of mouth.

One would think that such phobia should serve as a kind of energizer to consolidate the Thai security officials and related agencies to look for common policy options to counter Burma's move. It has not happened.

Strangely enough, the Thai military's intelligence officials, who have been working closely with the U.S. and Australian counterparts in tracking the junta's nuclear ambition for the past decade, know all along this dangerous ambition but they have not shared information and done serious assessments with the energy sector.

No wonder, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya is very concerned as he is well informed of Burma's well-kept secret. It is possible that Thailand, along with other ASEAN members, might raise the nuclear weapon program at the ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting next month in Hanoi (July 13-19) asking Rangoon to further clarify the issue. Seriously, nobody expects Burma to tell the truth. But ASEAN needs to put on record as its reputation is at stake, especially at the time the grouping wants to increase its profile to promote peace and stability as well as economic well-being internationally. After all, Burma was among the 10 signatories of the region's first no-nuke treaty, the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. ASEAN members are also parties to the Non Proliferation Treaty, but quite a few members have not yet ratified it.

The Obama Administration has been pushing for a nuclear-free world and trying to rid the world of potential nuclear terrorists. Expectation in the region is high that the U.S. would continue to pressure Burma internationally to comply with the relevant U.N. resolutions as well as any future engagement of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect all nuclear-related allegations. Sooner than later, ASEAN must take up Burma's nuclear plan and other global issues to iron out differences in order to forge common views and positions, which the ASEAN foreign ministers have to submit to their leaders at the ASEAN Summit in October in Hanoi.