The very upper echelons of the Burmese military dictatorship are said to be deeply divided over their country's future.
There are increasing signs inside Burma that the country's military rulers are preparing to free the pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi in coming weeks. But this imminent release of the opposition leader from house arrest is causing growing rifts within Burma's top military rulers.
Despite the recent show of unity at the Army Day celebrations in Rangoon on Saturday, there is increasing evidence that the head of state, Senior General Than Shwe, and Prime Minister Khin Nyunt are at loggerheads over the national reconciliation process.
The divisions between Burma's top leaders mark a deepening battle for control over the national reconciliation process, and ultimately the country as a whole. ''The level of mistrust and antipathy between the top leaders is unbelievable,'' said one senior military intelligence source. The problems seem to have come to the fore in December.
Senior military intelligence officers have been openly admitting to some of their contacts in recent months that there is a real problem between the two. ''The senior general just does not trust General Khin Nyunt,'' said one, ''even though he promoted him to the position of prime minister and gave him a mandate to pursue the national reconciliation process.''
Gen Khin Nyunt has been complaining to many of his close confidants that he is not being allowed to run the country effectively. ''There has been no real delegation of authority from the senior general to the cabinet,'' said a Burmese source close to the prime minister's office.
''The ministers are not allowed to be responsible for their departments and to get on with their work,'' he said. ''Recently General Maung Aye [head of the army and seen as in the Than Shwe camp] went up country and took seven ministers with him on the trip. This is not how a cabinet government should operate.''
In recent weeks, Gen Than Shwe has established his own coordinating committee to which all the ministers now also have to report, as well as attending the regular cabinet meetings presided over by Gen Khin Nyunt. So instead of the prime minister and the cabinet being allowed to run the country, they are now encumbered with reporting to yet another body.
Six months ago, Gen Than Shwe seemed to be taking a back seat and allowing Gen Khin Nyunt to run the country on a day-to-day basis. But since his meeting with Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in Pagan in November, Gen Than Shwe has been more proactive. He is now taking a very active role in the running of the country, and severely curtailing the prime minister's authority and room to manoeuvre.
He has also set up a think-tank of advisers on various policy matters _ though little is known about it _ as well as a team to monitor press reports, in the local as well as international media. This would normally be the responsibility of the Office of Military Intelligence, and the fact that Gen Than Shwe wants his own people doing this suggests he does not trust Gen Khin Nyunt.
So in effect, Gen Than Shwe has established a shadow government structure running parallel to the prime minister's in order to keep Gen Khin Nyunt and his ministers on their toes and effectively reduce their power. This can only increase the mistrust and fear throughout the military and government.
For the international community, the key issue is what impact this will have on the national reconciliation process and Ms Suu Kyi's freedom and role in Burma's political future. It will almost inevitably slow any potential progress on Gen Khin Nyunt's road map to a more democratic Burma.
''Prime Minister Khin Nyunt says he has announced to the world that he will do this,'' Burmese Foreign Minister Win Aung, a close ally of the prime minister, told the Bangkok Post in Phuket recently. ''I am going to do this; I have to do this,'' Win Aung quoted Gen Khin Nyunt as saying.
Now Gen Khin Nyunt is facing a major dilemma of how to proceed with the national reconciliation process. ''I will do it or die trying,'' he is said to have confided to a colleague recently. ''They have ordered me to do this and now they are tracking back.''
Every little step he takes concerning the process has to be sanctioned by Gen Than Shwe. The senior general oversees the smallest details related to the reconciliation process. He vetoed an early return to Rangoon of Tin Oo, nominal leader of Ms Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, from prison late last year when the military intelligence chiefs agreed it would be a good conciliatory gesture to the international community in the lead up to the international forum on Burma in Bangkok.
When Home (Interior) Minister Tin Hlaing approached Gen Khin Nyunt in December about Tin Oo's removal to house arrest, the prime minister, according to a Burmese source close to him, lost his temper and shouted: ''Go and tell the senior general.''
Gen Than Shwe even overruled a planned meeting between Gen Khin Nyunt and Ms Suu Kyi. In the first week of December, the military intelligence liaison, Brigadier-General Than Tun, informed the opposition leader that the prime minister had agreed to meet her in the near future. The meeting has still not taken place almost four months later because Gen Than Shwe has yet to approve it.
Everything to do with Ms Suu Kyi is controlled by Burma's top general. Approval for UN envoy Razali Ismail's last visit in March was held up till Gen Than Shwe agreed he could see the pro-democracy leader, according to sources with the Foreign Ministry. In fact, on every visit, the envoy's access to Ms Suu Kyi is dependent on Gen Than Shwe's approval.
Gen Khin Nyunt knows he must release Ms Suu Kyi in the near future if the national reconciliation process is not to be derailed. But this will not happen unless Gen Than Shwe agrees first.
Mr Razali has now thrown his weight behind Gen Khin Nyunt and appealed publicly for the prime minister to be given a ''mandate'' to carry out the road map. But so far there has been little evidence that Gen Than Shwe has taken any notice of international pressure _ particularly recently from China and Thailand _ to allow significant progress in the national reconciliation process.
The fact that Mr Razali has now so openly blamed Gen Than Shwe for the lack of political progress may actually hinder developments in the future. ''Any public talk of divisions between the top leaders angers them,'' said a senior government official. Gen Than Shwe, in particular, is sensitive, already fearing that his subordinates may be conspiring against him in the same way he moved against the former junta led by General Saw Maung in 1992.
Above all, Gen Than Shwe fears Gen Khin Nyunt is building up a power base _ with the ethnic minorities and the pro-democracy party _ that could challenge his power in the near future. Gen Khin Nyunt's strategy is clearly based on bringing all the ethnic minorities into the national reconciliation process. All the ceasefire groups have agreed to participate in the National Convention set up to further reconciliation and democracy at Gen Khin Nyunt's behest.
The key, as always, remains opposition leader Ms Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy. Gen Khin Nyunt knows that he needs the opposition leader to be able to press on with the road map, and particularly the convening of the National Convention and the drafting of a new constitution.
But he also needs Gen Than Shwe's support, or at least acquiescence, to be able to move forward. The senior general's antipathy towards Ms Suu Kyi is well known. He feels there is no need to move quickly and is happy to see the reconvening of the National Convention delayed as long as possible.
Burma is again at a crucial crossroads. The generals can no longer get away with expressions of commitment to reform alone. Real action is now needed.
The release of opposition leaders, including Ms Suu Kyi who is under house arrest, and the re-opening of the NLD offices would be a start. But Burma's generals must understand that even if they release Ms Suu Kyi in the near future, this will not be sufficient to deflect international pressure for political change. They must start substantive political talks with the opposition leader after she is freed.