It’s paid off thus far to be a rogue state

KAVI CHONGKITTAVORN
The Nation
October 11, 2004

Asia has the world’s largest number of rogue states. Burma, North Korea and Turkmenistan are three leading contenders. As Burma has shown, it is beneficial being a rogue state, provided a country knows how to play the great game. Burma’s success should be the envy of any tyrant state in the world. Its presence in Hanoi this weekend was an excellent illustration that when a despotically ruled nation plays its cards right and is consistent with its hard-line positions, it can go a long way. How on Earth can one explain the admission of Burma to the Asem process then, amid all the outcry about political suppression and human-rights violations? Thank the unwavering support from Asean, as well as those shameless trade-hungry EU members. Burma has set a very good example for other half-baked rogues in the world to follow. With Burma’s induction into Asean in 1997, the junta was able to strengthen its grip on the country, through regional support. This network and its cohorts provide much-needed life support through geographical solidarity, which the junta exploits. After all, regional approaches have been the norm in the world since 9/11.

While Burma’s survivability has highlighted the imperatives of regional support and consistency, North Korea’s longevity, with its current closed system, has been partly thanks to its leadership idiosyncrasy and high-stakes nuclear gambit. In that sense North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is a master of power politics. Since the demise of his father, Kim Il-sung, in 1994, he has emerged as a skilful negotiator and manipulator. In the past decade, he has successfully consolidated his power base and wrested total control of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) and the military apparatus. In her memoir, Madame Secretary, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright disclosed that the North’s leader wanted to follow the Thai model, meaning to reign but not to rule. That also explains why, despite the nature of the regime, Thai-North Korean relations are considered much better than Thai-South Korean relations. This is no exaggeration, judging from the numbers of official, especially high-level, visits.

North Korea’s nuclear capability, imagined or real, has become its main bargaining chip. It is interesting to note that Pyongyang has adroitly framed the argument for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula in terms of its nuclear potential. Therefore, even under the shadow of consistent threats, countries like South Korea and Japan, as well as international organisations, continue to give humanitarian aid to Pyongyang.

In multilateral negotiations that began in 1994, North Korea, like Burma, has continued to do what it does best – use a variety of evasive strategies to dodge international pressure. After all, neither country has an opposition. As such, both Burma and North Korea are learning from each other. For one thing, Burma has begun to realise that being a pariah state with good regional support is still not sufficient to guarantee long-standing survivability; it must construct a so-called negative deterrent to engage regional and internal communities on its own terms. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Burma wants to acquire knowledge of and research skills in nuclear weapons. Burma has eyed Russia and North Korea as potential mentors. Earlier this year, the US government warned Russia to abstain from providing any nuclear-related technologies to Burma, whether through bilateral arrangements or trade deals. Burma’s relations with North Korea have improved since the 1982 bombing in Rangoon, engineered by Pyongyang, that killed some South Korean cabinet members. Despite strong assertions from Rangoon that it has no desire to become a mini-nuclear state, it has beefed up its arms stockpiles with Russian-made jet fighters and Chinese-made artillery over the past three years.

Several retired regional military leaders have complained privately that Thailand will pay a very high price for security along the porous border with Burma Thanks to the largesse of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his business empire, Burma’s future is somewhat guaranteed.

Strong Thai backing these past three and a half years has augmented the power of Burmese strongman General Than Shwe and diminished the chances of Burmese democracy. Worse, it has greatly undermined the role of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi when it is most needed.

Turkmenistan could soon take a turn in the news headlines. This rich country is increasingly visible, because of its strategic location and abundant natural-gas reserves. Listening to a recent briefing by Turkmen journalists, one felt that the situation is similar to North Korea’s, because Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov’s personality cult permeates every inch of this former Soviet state. He is president for life; every deed and every word that is performed and spoken must bear his name. All news is checked and scrutinised to ensure there is not even the smallest aberration in the perception of the leader. Political structures are manipulated to guarantee Niyazov’s iron-fisted rule.

All in all, Asian tyrants in Burma, North Korea and Turkmenistan may exhibit different diplomatic methods in manipulating regional and international communities, but they share common traits when it comes to repression.