An Interview with Tin Maung Than
source : The Irrawaddy magazine
Tin Maung Than is a noted social critic who recently fled to Thailand after being accused of distributing transcripts of a speech by Brig-Gen Zaw Tun, a former deputy economic planning minister who attacked the Burmese regime's handling of the economy.
The former editor of Thintbawa magazine, Tin Maung Than spoke to Irrawaddy correspondents Min Zin and Moe Gyo in Bangkok shortly after his arrival in Thailand last November.
Question: Why did you decide to make your way to Thailand?
Answer: There were three reasons. [The first was that] I would not have been safe if I continued to stay inside Burma. There was a threat to my freedom and my life.
The second is that I have to continue my studies in the United States, doing a Ph.D. program.
The third is that, following my conscience as a writer, [I believe] that the individual must have his sovereignty and nobody should enter this, including the State. In one sense, the Burmese word "thakin" [master] means respect for individuality and humanity. The idea is that nobody has the right to determine anybody's destiny. So I cannot simply accept that the government prohibited me to travel. I have to follow what I advocate and my writer's conscience.
Q: You said that there was a threat to your life. Can you elaborate on this?
A: It doesn't necessarily mean a threat to my life. But you have signs that you are getting into the dangerous zone. The first thing is that you are restricted inside Burma.
The second sign was that the government-controlled Kyemon newspaper in March attacked our magazine Thintbawa and its editors and writers, saying that we were used by the political dissident groups. The paper clearly indicated that next time the government would not tolerate the magazine. Also, I got involved in the distribution of Brig-Gen Zaw Tun's speech [criticizing the regime's economic policies]. I was detained for five days. They clearly said that they are going to investigate how this speech is getting into the foreign media such as BBC, VOA and on the Internet. So I had to sign the paper saying that it was a political plot and I knew that I would be persecuted. So it is a very clear indication that my freedom was threatened. As you know, if you are persecuted, the imprisonment will be at least 7 or 10 years.
Q: What do you think was the significance of this speech, and what impact, if any, do you think it will have on thinking within the regime?
A: It was very significant in [terms of its impact on] the economic management of the government and the country. After you read Zaw Tun's speech, you get the impression that this military government needs more knowledge. Even among some of the decision-makers, they don't know what GDP is. I think this will shake up the whole regime. It calls for good management, transparency, and accountability. In a way, I feel that the speech also revealed that [Zaw Tun] did not have any place to speak out, even though he was Deputy Minister for National Planning and Development. So the government should consider how well the decision-making mechanism is working in their system, if even the deputy minister couldn't reach to the top level to report what's happening in the country. That's a major problem.
Q: But do you think anybody in the regime is really paying attention to this?
A: To a certain extent, a certain portion of military wouldn't accept what Zaw Tun claimed. But on the other hand, the regime has to recognize what's happening in the country. Some sections in the military are now holding some conferences on economic development with the Japanese. Now-actually, since before the Zaw Tun case-they have started listening to Burmese economists and academics from the Institute of Economics. It is a positive step, an improvement. We should welcome this. But the problem is that the whole institution is still lacking in knowledge of what development is.
Q: Do you think the regime will be more comfortable with criticism in the future?
A: I don't think that there will be more transparency [or that] the government will let people speak out in the immediate future. Because the classic response [of a military dictatorship] is to get more control. But in a way, it will help part of the military to become aware of reality.
Q: Do you think that Zaw Tun's speech indicates the emergence of Young Turks within the military who are willing to listen to the advice of scholars and experts?
A: I wouldn't go that far. It is a very small element. But I will say that it is at an embryonic stage. It's going to get bigger and bigger. The system doesn't allow even people within the regime to speak out. It is significant. But you shouldn't go that far. At the same time, we have to recognize that they are willing to learn about development. I'm hopeful that the military will change their policy from military supremacy to development. The logic of the dominant and current policy is that to develop Burma into a strong country, you have to strengthen the military first. But there is also an undercurrent policy saying that, "only when the country is strong will the military be strong." This is a reverse policy and also significant. But it is also possible that this group is merely making a tactical, not a strategic, shift. The goal is the same: a strong military. Anyway, if you gain knowledge about development, you will recognize that military supremacy is anathema to development. It is a self-contradictory. Once you get knowledge and you believe in development, you have to invite civilian participation.
Q: There seems to be an element within the regime that tends to be more reform-minded, at least in terms of economic development. What do you think of this?
A: I will say that transition is a result of the interaction between the ruling elite and the opposition, as well as the interaction between moderate forces and hard-liners within both sides. Change doesn't depend only on the military. When moderate forces start getting strong in the military, it helps the transition. I think we should welcome any development showing the emergence of the reform-minded element within the military. Holding conferences on economic development are good if they want to learn. It doesn't matter if they're working with Japan or another Asian country. But at the same time, I 'd like to warn, especially the Japanese and other Asians, not to be too romantic about this process. We have to look at the specific measures this regime is taking, whether they are moving in the direction of development or supremacy. Holding conferences doesn't necessarily mean they are going in the direction of development.
Q: Do you think that economic development is more important than democratization?
A: I think democracy is essential for development. The strategic issue now is how can we achieve democracy. In other words, we are tackling the question of transition. According to my understanding of transitional processes, there is no transition without the dominance of a liberalizer within the ruling elite. So, we are now dealing with two stages: liberalization and democratization. Liberalization is civilian participation in the process of decision-making, while democratization is citizen's political participation in the process of decision-making.. It sounds similar, but it is different in action. In the Burmese military context, potential liberalizers are those who are oriented towards development. When I talk about development in the current Burmese political context, I am talking about development only in the context of transition.
Q: Can you tell us about your experiences dealing with censorship in Burma?
A: In my career, sometimes I succeeded and other times I failed in dealing with censorship. By succeeding, I mean that I was able get past the censors and at the same time get my message across to my readers. But sometimes readers didn't understand what I meant. Other times, I couldn't cross the [censorship] line at all. So I would call theses cases my failures. It happened that way sometimes. Dealing with the censor, you have to be very tactful. Sometimes we have to change the presentation style. From the Western point of view, some of our articles are too long. But we have to make them long because it is sometimes necessary to have some cover-up. There are always two messages, [one on] the surface and [another] underneath. When you read the article, you can find the surface message and then go to the underneath message.
Q: In the past few years, there has been an explosion of journalism in Burma. Some say that the atmosphere for intellectual creativity has improved, but at the same time, you still have censorship. Do you see any kind of contradiction in these two trends?
A: I think there is no change, specifically [with regard to] tolerance of dissenting views. But in my experience, the regime can tolerate it to a certain extent if we are talking about economic or development policy. But they would never tolerate any political discussion. Every time we get into that area, we get censored. In a way, [there has been some] improvement. But overall, I don't think there is any real relaxation.
Q: In 1995 you wrote an article on HIV/AIDS in Burma. How did you do the research for the article, and how did you deal with censorship?
A: I believe almost all the words in the article passed. I think it depends on policy. At the time the international community didn't speak much on AIDS in Burma, but after that more people became aware of the problem. I think that at that time only the WHO was interested in it. It depends on whether or not the international community is interested in Burma. I think that at that time, there was no problem [to write about AIDS]. Q: How did you gather information? A: I went to Kengtung, Tachilek, Mae Sai. I went to townships in Monywa, Mandalay, and Rangoon. I read some of the research on sexually transmitted diseases done by Myanmar medical research teams. I met some prostitutes. Some were in the rehabilitation centers, others were still working. I met the managers of hotels. Routine reporting for me.
Q: Was there any response from the government?
A: No response.
Q: Can you say more about the current HIV/AIDS situation in Burma?
A: It's very difficult to say anything because I'm not in a position to talk about it. We do have information from the international community and the government health department. But there is a wide gap between the two sets of statistics. I have friends who are general practitioners; they complain that they have increasing number of AIDS patients in their clinics. But I can't really say that AIDS is spreading in Burma, because I don't have enough information.
Q: Some people say that increased exposure to the outside world has corrupted Burmese youth and the values of Burmese society. Do you agree with this?
A: I don't think there has been a change in social values. I think there has been a rise in consumerism in Burma, because now you have more commodities flowing into the country, so you can choose consumer products. But I don't think that this has had a great impact on social values. What people want is more knowledge and more access to information. I haven't had a chance to meet many young people, as I don't go to the clubs. I know that there are some sexually liberalized young people. But we had this in the 1970's and 1980's as well; it's just that now you have clubs and it's more open to outsiders. Generally the system is conservative and rigid.
Q: What about drug and alcohol abuse?
A: My impression is that there has been no change. In my student years, I had friends who drank liquor regularly and had a very hedonistic way of life. This is normal.
Q: More and more households now depend on extra income from all members of the family. What impact does this have on family life?
A: I don't think that there has been any change. I was brought up by my mother and my mother was the breadwinner. But you are right that more people have to work now to cover living costs, so there might be some shift in the form of respect. I'm not sure. You can see a decline in traditional culture, especially in music. People are more interested in heavy metal, hip-hop and rap, rather than classical music. But that has nothing to do with social values. It's just that tastes have changed, not values. It depends on how you define values. Young people prefer to wear T-shirts rather than traditional dress. They like to wear jeans. My daughters like Brittany Spears, not traditional music.
Q: Do you think young people in Burma are more money-centered these days?
A: We once conducted a survey of readers in which we asked who they would marry if they were to marry a foreigner. Most young people, over fifty percent, said they would choose a businessman. In another survey, we asked medical doctors in Monywa district what they would study if they could do their studies again. Most--again, over fifty percent--said they would study business. But I don't think it is a shift in values. Before, you didn't have a chance to get into [a legitimate] business, and if you went into the black market, it was illegal. A lot of friends who became medical doctors were more disposed to become businessmen. So if there is an entrepreneurial tendency in a person, now that person becomes a businessman. I think it already existed. Before you couldn't see it but now you can. I think it's similar in every country: people are oriented towards money and social status when they receive an education. But in Burma, [young people] went into business because the universities were shut down, so they wanted to make money.
Q: Universities reopened late last year after a long-term closure. Do you see any hope for higher education in Burma?
A: If we are thinking of the international level of education, Burmese universities are quite far from reaching that level. The first problem is the salary of professors is quite low. They have to work extra hours in private tuition schools to cover their living expenses, so they don't have any time to do research work. They have only very old journals and magazines. The libraries are quite old. The government regards the students as potential opposition to military rule, so they disperse them to the various small colleges, very far away from the city. I think that that political approach to education made the quality of the education worse and worse. If one says that the quality of education at higher levels is poorer, I won't deny it.
Q: Health and education are two areas that tend to get politicized. How do you feel about this?
A: In Burma, many issues become polarized. Everything becomes a political issue because of the policy of military supremacy. Anything that disagrees with the official line becomes political. I think it is a system that isolates leaders/decision-makers from reality. In authoritarian regimes, the system drives people to make false reports to their superiors. According to a recent World Health Organization report, Burma is next to last in health performance. But the government thought it was a political attack by the opposition. At the same time, high officials in the health department have to defend themselves in the context of government policy, because they can't criticize the government. Where the situation is politicized, it is very easy to say, "Oh no, it is not our responsibility. We are doing very well, but the opposition gave misinformation to the WHO, and the WHO only relied on this information." So that is the system. If you have a [military] supremacy attitude, you think yourself above the people and above the problems. In real life, it doesn't solve any problems at all. That's what's happening in Burma today. They thought they were being attacked, so they just attacked back. It becomes a circle.
Q: To what extent does the junta react to the international media? Who monitors the media?
A: I think the international media has a very important role in influencing policy. For example, the government allowed a recent issue of Time magazine, in which they made a box on Aids in Burma, to enter the country. They tolerated the criticisms. I think that they consider [foreign news reports] when formulating policies. Not the top brass, but high-ranking officers who have to report to the generals. This link is very important. The high-ranking officers who are close to the decision-makers read every piece of work. And they have to acknowledge the international perception. You cannot get immediate results, but it has a long-range effect. But even high-ranking officers have limitations. They try to persuade their bosses to change policy, but the system is rigid.
Q: What about the media's analysis of splits in the leadership? What kind of impact does this have?
A: Here you have a classic response. They will pretend that they are united. Maybe for six months or one year they will have unity. There is policy conflict between military supremacy and development. One group represents supremacy and the other development. This is why you have ceasefire agreements with minority groups--because one side is oriented towards development.
Q: Can you be more specific? For example, how does this apply to the Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt factions?
A: I won't comment on people. When you focus on a person, at the same time you are restricted from their thinking. You are attached to that person and you focus on that person; this is what happens in politics. I would rather be detached from the person and focus more on the policies and ideas. I assume that apart from the Khin Nyunt faction there are [other moderate] groups. If you are limited to Khin Nyunt, then when Khin Nyunt is kicked out, you have no choice but to become more responsive to the hardliners. That is a very grave danger in our thinking. I would rather focus on the assumption that there are various moderate forces. In every organization you have hardliners and moderate forces. Sometimes in democratic organizations you can see who is moderate and who is a hardliner. In authoritarian organizations, particularly rigid organizations like the military, you can't easily see who is moderate and who is hardline. [People assume] that Khin Nyunt is moderate and Maung Aye is hardline. Don't focus on the person. Let's assume that we have moderate forces in the military and you have to adopt your strategy to deal with these forces.
Q: Do you make a distinction between development and military supremacy camps? Do you think the development-oriented people can lead the country to political liberalization, or at least start working with the opposition?
A: In the immediate future there will not be political openness. There will not be any reconciliation between the opposition and the military. What I expect to see is reform within the regime. That is, [I expect it] to liberalize to a certain extent. Let's talk about specifics. They will start looking at other models besides that of [deposed Indonesian dictator] Suharto's regime. In the past, the supremacists looked at Suharto's regime, [but now they are looking] at the Japanese regime. Another thing is that I would look at the cabinet. How many technocrats are in the cabinet? If [the regime is] development-oriented, there will be more economists in the cabinet. They will become decision-makers in the country's policy. But in the current military regime, all the decision-makers are military or ex-military officials. Liberalization means civilian participation in the decision-making process, not necessarily political participation. This is the first step. Once you have this decision- making process you are close to reconciliation. Then you have to look at the degree of concentration of military personnel in civil administration. Is there any due process? The military management style is the three C's: control, command, and communication. They never go beyond the three Cs. I would suggest looking at these specific measures. I don't expect too much political reform, but I can reasonably expect liberalization in the regime and some civilian participation in decision-making processes.
Q: One idea coming out now is that the international community should resume humanitarian aid to Burma. What do you say to this?
A: This is a dilemma. You want to give one dollar to the poor people, but you actually end up giving one dollar to the military because there is no transparency in the hard currency budget. You might help people but it will only be in the short term. In the long run, you support the military expansion that continuously generates poverty. So I think that for the time being, except in emergencies, it is unwise to give aid to a country like Burma. But if the government policy shifts to genuine development and the hard currency budget becomes transparent, then it's fine.
Q: Do you think that international economic sanctions help to foster the transition from military supremacy to development?
A: I think it will help produce a policy shift in the military regime. Change won't come without a crisis. [But for sanctions to have an impact] it will take more time because it is a rigid situation. You cannot expect to impose economic sanctions, and then one or two years later get the results. It won't happen. If you don't impose sanction and decide on economic engagement, it means you are engaging with the military, because when you look at investment, almost all joint ventures in the manufacturing sector are with the Myanmar Economic Holdings Company Ltd., which is military-run. I don't think this engagement will lead to a relaxation of their policy because they will think that theirs is the right policy. [The regime's approach is] to build strong military institutions in order to make the country strong. But the decision-makers within the regime don't have any understanding of development, or of economics and trade. So there is a great tendency towards arbitrary decision-making. Supremacy is not stable. I don't think the present environment is beneficial for the international business community.
Q: Do you think the opposition can convince the military or a section of the military that dialogue is the most beneficial option for both sides?
A: What I don't like about both sides is that they both regard each other as the enemy. But I understand that if you are in a conflict, you will feel that way. I think the first step is to stop regarding the other side as your enemy. Whether we like it or not, [both sides are] a part of our body. The military is part of our body, whether it is good or bad. The opposition is also part of our body, whether it is good or bad. We should be kind to ourselves as a country. And you have to recognize that there are different perceptions among the military, the opposition and the international community of what negotiations mean. So we have a communications gap. For example, the ruling elite might think the opposition is threatening their lives, but actually the opposition may not have this idea. There are misunderstandings. We have to explore this. I'd also like to create a situation where both sides can work together, instead of just "negotiating". Sometimes, you think you are different but when you work together you find that you are similar. For the international community, they should take more aggressive steps. What I mean by "aggressive" is that they should do more than just talking about negotiations. They-the major powers-should also bring China into the scenario.
Q: Do you think that Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have been intransigent and confrontational?
A: I don't see any aggressiveness on the part of Suu Kyi or the NLD. I think they are just defending their position, not attacking the government. In a way, they are giving the signals to the government that they recognize the administration. Because if you look at the decisions of the CRPP (Committee to Represent the People's Parliament), you will find that they rectify [only] some of the laws and decrees made by the SPDC military regime. I think they are giving a message: "You recognize me as a legislature, I recognize you as an administration." At the same, they said that they wouldn 't rectify this law or that law. Most of the media in the international community tend to think that Suu Kyi is confrontational. I think she needs some diplomatic skill. But on the other hand, the lack of this diplomatic skill could be part of her legitimacy. As you know, a prominent writer once called her father "Aung San the Wild". Perhaps we can understand her in light of this family tradition. But I still feel she needs some diplomatic skills. For example, I read one of her speeches in which she used the word "enemy" for the military. Why we are talking about "the enemy"? She should be more polite, but still stand on principle.
Q: Some people say it would be better to leave Suu Kyi out of the dialogue process with the regime, at least at the initial stages. What do you think?
A: I don't think this will solve the problem. I disagreed with the NLD's previous decision that Aung San Suu Kyi must participate in the negotiations. Aung San Suu Kyi doesn't necessarily have to be there. But [even after] the NLD changed their position on this, saying they were ready to have a dialogue at any level, they didn't get any response from the SPDC. The NLD's decision [to back down on Suu Kyi's participation in negotiations] gave the SPDC the upper hand in public relations. The [international] media, such as Asiaweek, even suggested that it might be better if Suu Kyi left the country. Perhaps it is time to leave. But I don't think it will solve the problems.
Q: There have been several attempts by veteran politicians, senior abbots and resigned NLD MP's to mediate between the regime and the opposition. Can we say that this represents the emergence of a "third force" to foster reconciliation?
A: I don't think it is a third force. They just say that both sides should talk. They simply call for negotiations. Since 1988, that has been the opposition's policy: "Let's talk". The opposition has never that it wouldn't talk.
Q: You have said that there would have to be some sort of crisis before the regime would change its policies. What sort of crisis seems most likely?
A: An economic crisis is the most likely. That's why they have started looking at economic development. They have realized that if they fail to develop the country, an economic crisis could decide their fate.
Q: Some suggest that Burma is falling into China's strategic orbit. What will be the long-term effects of growing Chinese influence on Burma?
A: I'm not sure if Burma is really getting into China's orbit. To my knowledge, China has never obstructed UN resolutions [criticizing the regime].
Q: Do you think that the traditional social hierarchy and patron-client relationships are relevant to an understanding of the current Burmese situation?
A: I think they are irrelevant. There is no patron-client relation [between the state and the people of Burma]. Burmese have always regarded the king as an enemy. They try to stay as much as possible away from the government or the king. This mentality I think prevents the Burmese from getting involved in the opposition movement. But more important than the traditional political culture is the present system, which prevents individuals from getting into organizational units. Since they are not allowed organize, they become isolated. You may not like the government, but you are not sure if others also oppose the government. Before taking action, you have to look and wait [to see what others are doing]. That's why you can feel tensions when you go to Burma. I think these tensions will burst if the government can't handle them properly.
Q: You have written articles on topics such as Burmese notions of charity and Vipassana (Insight) meditation. Do you think that Buddhism is particularly relevant to the current situation?
A: The essence of Theravada Buddhism is absolute individualism. What happens in Burma is quite different from what's written in the Theravada teachings. Anyway, Burmese see themselves as guests in this life. When there is a funeral, we offer a fan and on this there is a poem titled "Guest". You are just a guest in this life. Life is very short. Burmese say that man is a traveler in the realm of samsara, the round of rebirth. When you see the mob or demonstration, you see it and pass away. When there is an oppressive situation, it is similar. It is the whole ideology. Samsara is more important than their present lives. It makes them isolated.
Q: In your articles, you have described the Burmese nationalist movement as a relevant model for understanding the current situation, in which many Burmese people feel that they are still slaves. But some people believe that Burmese nationalism was ethnocentric, and took a paternalistic attitude towards other ethnic groups. How do you respond to this?
A: I don't think the majority of Burmans have ethnocentric tendencies. Burmese have a long history of living together with Shan, Mon, Arakanese, and so on. This is one of the characteristics of the Burmese.
Q: But some people still say that there is a policy to Burmanize other ethnic groups.
A: I think we have to differentiate between the policies of the ruling group and the people. I don't think the majority of people have this ethnocentric attitude. Maybe among some people in politics, there might be an ethnocentric attitude. Maybe, maybe. Historically, when the "We Burman Association" was founded [during the struggle against British colonial rule], "Burman" was defined as all ethnic groups residing in the nation. Now the military government has reversed this definition. They changed Burma to Myanmar.
Q: Don't you think it seems pretty patronizing to say that the "We Burman Association" represented the whole nation, including non-Burmans?
A: No, in that situation you have to invent a new word. Have you ever heard, in history or in recent history, of an ethnic conflict among people--for example, a Burmese village fighting with a Shan village--for racial reasons? If there is a fight, it is a fight between political groups. We don't have any conflict at all. I don't have any knowledge of it. As people, Burmese are not ethnocentric. But if minorities feel [that the Burmese are ethnocentric], it comes from the bureaucracy, not from the people.
Q: Do you believe that the recently reported meetings between Aung San Suu Kyi and Khin Nyunt are an important step forward?
A: Oh yeah! The meetings will have a great impact not only on the opposition and the military, but also on the whole Burmese political climate. Firstly, meetings between opposing political groups mean civility. In this sense, we can say that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and General Khin Nyunt are bringing civility into our politics, which I think is somewhat militant. Moreover, General Khin Nyunt is introducing this civility into the military hierarchy, which is traditionally deadly rigid and closed. The highest civility in politics is working out a consensus while recognizing differences. In other words, they are taking their first steps on the road to "unity in disunity", a concept quite important for modernization. Secondly, in transitional negotiations, opening communication channels is the rule. Whether it will lead to settlement or not is another problem. There may be ups and downs, but both sides have to maintain that channel. I am hopeful they will.
Q: You mentioned that the regime would only liberalize in the event of a crisis. Do you believe that a crisis has occurred prompting the government to open a dialogue?
A: When I said that, I didn't mean only the Burmese military regime. To my knowledge, change happens under two circumstances. The first is if leaders have a learning spirit and are prudent. [The second] is if they are in crisis. In this case, we can sense crisis not only in the military but also in the opposition. I am afraid that some may interpret "in a crisis" to mean "be defeated." I would like to emphasize that although crisis signifies a sort of failure, it doesn't mean "defeated." Here, I would say that crisis and prudence led to negotiations. Let me quote the chairman of the Communist Party of South Africa, Joe Slovo. He said this at crucial point in the transition process in South Africa, when the ANC was just getting into negotiations [with the apartheid regime]. I think this political line can also be applied to both the NLD and the military. He said: "We are not dealing with a defeated enemy." Now both sides need more prudence than pride.