Rethink Sanctions on Burma
By James Finch
Mar 02, 2001:Far Eastern Economic Review-Issue cover-dated March 8, 2001
The writer is the managing partner of the Rangoon office of Russin & Vecchi, an international law firm
Recently, I was picked up at the airport by our office driver. On the way back, the car, an old one, coughed and died. The driver apologized profusely, started the car, jumped out and proceeded to gun the engine from under the bonnet. After a few seconds, we resumed our journey. The same procedure had to be repeated twice more. When I last used the car several weeks earlier, I had noticed a similar problem. I had told the driver to have the car fixed but he had not understood my English. Instead, he did what came naturally--enduring things the way they are and making the best of them.
That is how the majority of Burmese see the economic sanctions imposed on their country by the West. They make life difficult, but Burmese endure them--historically, these hardships seem small by comparison to past travails. But today, a few positive signs are emerging. In January, Razali Ismail, Kofi Annan's special envoy to Burma, announced that secret talks between the National League for Democracy and the government have been taking place since October.
Yet proponents of sanctions insist these should be continued, and even increased. But since everyone agrees that they haven't worked, the proponents cannot claim their efforts will result in a change of heart by the government. So why keep the sanctions? These proponents now confide, very privately, that they are waiting for sanctions to cause a popular uprising of the Burmese people against the government. Only, there are a couple of key inaccuracies here. Proponents of sanctions often cite the unrest in the late 1980s as evidence that the Burmese are capable of revolutionary activities. But that unrest led nowhere. Futhermore, the policies of the NLD and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, consistently have been against violence.
So if the sanctions constitute barking up the wrong tree, what should be done? The United States, which has pressured other countries to follow its lead on sanctions, should use the change of administration to gracefully redefine its direction. Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his confirmation hearings, proposed that the Senate review the sanctions the U.S. now imposes on around 75 countries. Congressional action to eliminate a number of these across the board would provide a credible context in which to rethink the sanctions against Burma.
That said, the new U.S. administration should not enter the political quagmire involving the military government and the NLD right away. The situation surrounding the talks is delicate. If any foreign involvement is appropriate at present, it is that of Razali, who has been involved from the start.
Instead the U.S. should start by concentrating its efforts on other problems in Burma, where progress can easily be made and measured. First, there is drugs. The Burmese government has made real efforts recently to eradicate drug trafficking--within its limited financial capabilities. Aid and expertise should be proffered on a larger scale from abroad. Next, there's the issue of forced labour. The situation surrounding the recently declared International Labour Organization sanctions illustrates the possibility for improvement. The government has offered to amend the Towns and Village Acts (which enable local governments to use conscripted labour under certain circumstances) with an order, rather than a law, as required by the ILO. The government has offered other concessions as well. Rather than condemn its progress as too little, too late, efforts should be redoubled to achieve success.
And then there are the ethnic conflicts. The real challenge in Burma is to resolve the conflicts between regional and ethnic groups. Outside help with such negotiations would go a long way toward breaking existing deadlocks.
If measurable progress were made in these areas, the U.S. Congress could phase out the sanctions and any remaining "pro-democracy" projects--U.S. funded anti-government efforts, particularly those taking place in the sensitive ethnic areas.
Despite the fact that there have been some talks, the parties are still locked into positions with few new alternatives in sight. Before serious progress is made, the talks will no doubt break down and have to be restarted--more than once. This will be a long process. Measures like those suggested above--put forward by the countries now insisting on sanctions--would widen the universe of options and create potential solutions. These would, in turn, save face and lead to practical solutions acceptable to all.