"I think the president wants to achieve real positive change." So said Burmese democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, in the days after she met President Thein Sein. The event itself was a surprise, her first meeting with a senior regime official since 2002. For his part, Thein Sein has recently called on political exiles to return home, announced a "peace overture" to ethnic nationalities, and supported key macro-economic policy reforms.
These and other hints of change have Burmese and outside observers wondering whether the regime's superficial transition from military junta to civilian dictatorship over the past year might presage something more meaningful. While the history of the Burmese regime warrants skepticism, the excitement this has aroused shows that even an unserious reform effort could pose a serious challenge for Burma's democratic movement.
One plausible explanation for the overtures is that the regime, or at least significant segments of it, has realized that if it opens up and rationalizes the Burmese economy, including creating a more stable regulatory environment, it can make an end run around Ms. Suu Kyi while turning its Western critics into willing investors in Burma's economy. For years the Burmese junta's generals have complained that the West subjects them to a double standard. They look at China, Vietnam and other non-democratic neighbors, and conclude that the West is punishing them for being a dictatorship while virtually ignoring a lack of democracy in other contexts where there is business to be done.
At the same time, Burma's neighbors have expended considerable effort to encourage the regime to open up its economy and adopt less draconian tactics. Even U.S. diplomats occasionally comment that they would like to see a Burma that looked more like China. Having decided that they want Burma to chair the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2014, the generals' cosmetic political reforms and newfound interest in poverty alleviation initiatives suggest they are experimenting with this strategy.
There should be no illusions that the regime as a whole is either willing or able to launch serious political and economic reforms of the type that are needed to rebuild Burma. The generals have talked about political and economic reforms before, and launched some during the Khin Nyunt era, only to retreat when senior leaders would not relinquish control.
Thein Sein's overtures come against a backdrop of continued detention of thousands of political prisoners, and fresh reports of Burmese army attacks on civilians in the Kachin, Shan, Mon and Chin states. Rumors of an increasingly bitter power struggle with Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo raise serious questions about the degree to which Thein Sein can deliver on even preliminary reform plans.
Burma's dictators also face a challenge that their counterparts in other countries generally do not: a well-established democratic opposition in the National League for Democracy, whose 1990 election victory and charismatic leader endow it with high levels of legitimacy at home and abroad. Regime outreach to the NLD and ethnic nationalities is couched in terms of getting the holdouts to come to terms with the deeply flawed 2008 constitution. Doing so would necessitate the NLD disavowing its election victory and the ethnics relinquishing their means of preserving autonomy—clearly non-starters.
Beyond Ms. Suu Kyi's easily revocable freedom and some initial meetings with the regime, the changes to date amount to little more than a new tone. With the regime's credibility starting from such a low base, convincing its most persistent domestic and international critics ultimately will require irreversible steps toward reform. The NLD remains focused on the emergence of a genuine dialogue on national reconciliation. Such a dialogue would necessarily involve significant releases of political prisoners, substantial changes to the 2008 constitution, and a real peace process with ethnic nationalities to be taken seriously.
These would be big challenges for any government, and seem insurmountable for one as insecure and brittle as Burma's regime. If the regime instead began to implement some economic reforms that could benefit Burma's longsuffering citizens even as it failed to engage in serious national reconciliation, there likely would be tremendous pressure on the democratic movement to get on board "for the good of the Burmese people." While Ms. Suu Kyi has always expressed a willingness to work with the regime toward those ends, the democratic movement has insisted that political issues are at the root of Burma's economic problems and must be addressed in order for sustainable economic development to take root.
After years of abysmal economic policy and severe political repression, it is tempting to believe it is sufficient that the Burmese regime is moving toward slightly greater political and economic openness. But Burma's democrats have higher aspirations for their country, and their supporters should too. Those who support human rights and democracy in Burma should avoid pressuring Burma's democrats to pursue well-intentioned poverty alleviation schemes as a substitute for changing political structures designed to enrich and preserve the ruling clique. Instead the pressure should stay focused on political reform.
Ms. Currie is a senior fellow with the Project 2049 Institute, a Washington-based think tank.