Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's visit to Naypyidaw, the almost secluded capital of Burma, on Oct 11 has marked a new phase in the Democrat Party's relations with the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).
It was a crucial visit since the election in Burma is imminent. Due to take place on Nov 7, it will be the first poll in 20 years. It was also the first time a prime minister from his political party has paid a visit to Burma in almost two decades. During 1997-2001, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai refused to visit Burma because of his supposedly pro-democracy agenda at home. But the situation surrounding Thai-Burmese relations has changed over the years, so has the current government's policy toward Naypyidaw.
Legitimate or otherwise, Mr Abhisit's foreign policy towards Burma reflects the political realities in both countries. Thailand's democratisation has in the past few years stagnated with the Abhisit government fighting for its survival against political threats posed by the red shirt movement.
Meanwhile, the Democrat Party's long-held pro-democracy platform has increasingly become rhetorical. The perception of the Abhisit government being reluctant to push for political reforms serves to belittle its pro-democracy credentials. On this basis, Thailand is finding it more difficult to preach to its Burmese neighbour about the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights.
In Burma too, with the election upcoming, the Burmese generals have planned this political transition carefully, ensuring that political power will remain firmly in the hands of the military elite - some of whom are now wearing civilian clothes. Like it or not, there will be no new Burma, just a more civilianised and perhaps a less repressive regime.
Mr Abhisit's visit to Naypyidaw seems to symbolise the shift of direction in Thailand's Burmese policy and its realistic response to Burma's political transition.
Currently, there are two emerging views in Thailand. On the one hand, the advent of a civilian regime in Burma could instigate a legitimacy crisis and a loss of justification for Thailand's traditional hostile policy toward Burma which was deeply rooted in their embittered historical interactions. After the elections, however, Thailand will expectedly legitimise Burma's civilian regime, thus debunking its old construct of Burma as a threat.
The first few years after the elections will be a trial period for the new regime. There will be numerous obstacles that will stand to challenge Burma's civilianised government. The change will not be restricted within the domestic domain, but will engender an impact on Thai-Burmese relations. With this change, Thailand is conditioned to search for a new legitimacy in its policy toward Burma. Certain Thai governments in the past exploited the negative image of Burma's military regime in order to justify their foreign policy interests and appease their international allies though they were not any less despotic than their Burmese counterparts.
In retrospect, Thai-Burmese relations have been marred by distorted historical memories and the state-constructed perception of threat. Ties became "normal" only when the leaders of both sides agreed to let their economic imperatives take a front seat in the conduct of diplomacy toward each other.
Sceptics may have dismissed the upcoming elections; they believe Burma is leaping into a greater unknown. Regardless, Burma will be recasting itself into a more recognisable entity, not necessarily a democratic one.
Asean and Thailand will be welcoming the new regime, since both have already endorsed the SPDC's road map to democracy.
On the other hand, the arrival of Burma's civilianised regime will broaden Thailand's policy options. Thailand will no longer be confined within its own self-serving discourse of an antagonistic Burma. Indeed, prior to Mr Abhisit's visit, his Democrat government, known for its critical view of Burma in the past, has gradually distanced itself from such a discourse while renewing the country's friendly ties with the junta.
The Abhisit government has made a bold step in the new implementation of its policy toward Burma. Departing from its pro-democracy, pro-West and anti-junta standpoint, Mr Abhisit earlier instructed the Ministry of Commerce to put in place necessary measures that would increase two-way trade with the Burmese regime.
A special economic zone along the common border will soon be set up, thus encouraging Thais to seek business opportunities in Burma. Mr Abhisit himself revealed that Thailand was in the process of upgrading the Singkhon checkpoint in Prachuap Khiri Khan's Muang district to serve the new economic centre in southern Burma. On top of this, Thailand has a plan to develop a route that links Kanchanaburi with Tavoy as a western gateway to markets in Thailand.
This policy of turning enemy land into a marketplace is a familiar one. It was introduced by former prime minister Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-1991) and repackaged by Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006) as part of his promoting Thailand as a dominant player in mainland Southeast Asia. Today, Mr Abhisit has followed in the footsteps of Thailand's past leaders, even when he previously profoundly criticised them, particularly the billionaire Thaksin, for being obsessed with economic gains at the expense of promoting democracy in Burma.
But Mr Abhisit could argue that Burma is now entering into a new political phase - one with a greater sense of political openness, and that it would only be logical if the Thai government, at present or in the future, diversified its options, not only concentrating on preserving its security-centric, pro-democracy position, but also giving prominence to bilateral economic activities. Burma in a new guise could therefore renew the "romance" in the Thai-Burmese relationship that has been lost since the pro-junta Thaksin government was overthrown in a military coup in September 2006.
These two emerging trends signal a sea change in Thai policy toward Burma. Anti-Burmese regime movements may not like to hear this: but it is highly possible that the civilianisation of Burma and its accompanying effects will have the potential to help stabilise bilateral relationships in the long run.
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, a former diplomat, is the author of "A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations".