"I was pleased with the discussion with Burmese leaders but the outcome of the visit depends on what the concrete and positive decisions that they are taking in a number of areas. I got the sense that my message was understood and I think they must be debating as to how best to respond," said Ibrahim Gambari, the U.N. undersecretary for political affairs, who has just returned from Rangoon after holding a second round of negotiations with the military junta and Aung San Suu Kyi.
These are routine diplomatic remarks that depict the underlying failure of Gambari to have any tangible impact on three main issues _ restoration of democracy, release of Suu Kyi and the initiation of a national reconciliation process in Burma. After six months of diplomatic engagement, the ``good offices path" initiated by Gambari in May this year has so far yielded nothing that can be labeled as "positive" except that the Burma's authorities have shown some relaxation on the contacts Suu Kyi is permitted with the outside world.
Apart from giving permission for a meeting between Suu Kyi and Gambari, the military junta has not budged an inch from its stance. Even after the passage of 16 years, the military junta is still so entrenched that international pressure has not been able to push it to change. Now the sticky question is why the international community, despite all the noise and diplomatic interactions, has so far failed to generate enough thrust to bring about the restoration of democracy in Burma.
The answer to this question is twofold. Firstly, after the house arrest of Suu Kyi and the main leaders of her National League for Democracy (NLD), the lack of a physical infrastructure has been a key factor behind the failure of the NLD to mobilize and organize a mass movement against the military junta. Some 1,185 political prisoners, mostly belonging to the NLD, have been behind bars for a long time and there is no organized and coherent leadership structure left in the country that can stage any kind of popular uprising to dislodge the junta's grip on power.
The iron hand with which the military junta has been dealing with political forces has kept the shattered political leadership from taking any step in this direction. During the last 17 years of her house arrest in her rambling lakeside home in Rangoon, Suu Kyi has continually repeated her mistake of relying on international pressure, instead of generating and leading an indigenous mass movement to restore democracy in Burma. During the past one and a half decades, she has made no direct or indirect effort to mobilize an "organized and structured" uprising against the junta. The major flaw in her political strategy is that she has depended on international intervention to salvage democracy in her country. Obviously, in the absence of any internal pressure, the military junta will not pay any heed to external pressures.
And secondly, at the same time, the international community, owing to the divergent political and economic interests of regional powers, has not been able to generate a synergy to compel the military junta to release Suu Kyi, let alone restore democracy. It is this conflict of interest among the "stakeholders" that has been at the root of the failure of the international community to pressure the military junta. Washington considers Burma a "serious threat to peace and security" but it has done little to convey its "concern" to the junta. It is only over the past year that Washington has started persuading the U.N. Security Council to adopt a tough stance on Burma _ even to the point of pledging a resolution to impose sanctions on the military regime. This is all that the United States has so far done to register its concern.
On the other hand, China and India, the two big players in the region which have been doing fairly good trade with Rangoon, do not at all buy the "serious threat" notion being propagated by Washington. The European Union has a rather more lenient and less emotional approach. Germany is still giving sponsorships to nominees of the junta. In fact, ASEAN, being the most influential regional platform, should play the leading role in influencing the Burmese military junta. But, because of a fear of creating rifts in its ranks, ASEAN prefers constructive engagement rather than sanctions. This has inversely encouraged the regime to further tighten its grip. Australia, despite its stern official stand, has been continuing with its indirect involvement and interaction with the military junta in the form of courses on human rights for Burmese police. So there is a clear division among the stakeholders. This is the real problem.
The conflict of interests and lack of a "common and unified" approach have certainly emboldened General Than Shwe and his associates to blatantly go ahead with their so-called seven-point roadmap to democracy _ which is nothing more than a gimmick to give a civilian-face to military rule. The opening of the national convention last month, which is being promoted as the first step toward seven-point democratization and national reconciliation, is a clear indication that the military junta will pay no heed to an acutely divided international community.
The writer is a freelance columnist and political analyst based in Karachi, Pakistan.