In a carefully worded statement issued after meeting with UN special envoy for Burma Ibrahim Gambari on Friday, Lee noted Suu Kyi has expressed readiness to cooperate with the Burmese government to open dialogue on national reconciliation and said he believed the UN's help is needed to facilitate this effort. It was the first time Asean has acknowledged Suu Kyi and her political role. The grouping has called for her release since 2003 following international pressure, but it has never been this enthusiastic.
Earlier, Suu Kyi released a statement through Gambari in Singapore that mentioned Asean's role. She wrote: "I believe that stability, prosperity and democracy for my country, living at peace with itself and with full respect for human rights, offers the best prospect for my country to fully contribute to the development and stability of the region in close partnership with its neighbours and fellow Asean members, and to play a positive role as a respected member of the international community." As such, she also accepts Asean as an indispensable player.
A total of 12 years have elapsed since two failed attempts to link up Asean and Suu Kyi. She was released in July 1995 after six years under house arrest ahead of the Asean ministerial meeting in Brunei Darussalam. A few days later she wrote a letter to Asean foreign ministers urging them not to recognise the regime in Rangoon.
Her letter was sent directly to ministers, but there was no response. Truth be told, there was no precedent in Asean of a dissident leader's direct correspondence with Asean leaders being answered. Asean's strict protocol would just not permit that kind of intervention. Indeed, it was Suu Kyi's first known attempt to develop a rapport with Asean leaders. But they rejected her.
Another attempt was made for her to meet Rangoon-based Asean diplomats in one of their residences ahead of the meeting in Brunei. Burma, which was about to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, protested and as a result the meeting was immediately called off.
In the more than a decade since then, Asean has become extremely tolerant and has believed naively that Burma, admitted in 1997, would yield to peer pressure as well as contribute to the grouping's solidarity and common objective in pursuing dialogue and national reconciliation. This has been wishful thinking on the part of Asean.
Apart from Suu Kyi's new-found pragmatism, the Burmese regime has also come forward to re-establish dialogue with the UN. Despite the mixed signals following comments made by Charles Petrie, the head of the United Nations Development Programme in Burma, the UN in its "good office role" remains the key facilitator in ending the deadlock.
Why did the junta leaders not reject the UN's role this time round? There are many reasons, but three stand out. First, international pressure has not yet evaporated, as the junta and many analysts would have wished. If planned sanctions spread to include the banking sector, they would further damage the Burmese economy, and its trading partners, especially those in Asean, would suffer.
Second, the junta's leaders known who their friends on the UN Security Council are, so it is better for them to deal at that level. In the worst-case scenario China and Russia would come to the rescue. After all, they have made it clear that they will not back any measure that Burma does not support.
At the end of last month, the Rangoon regime reacted angrily to a Thai proposal calling for peace talks modelled after the successful six-party talks with North Korea. In his second letter to General Than Shwe, Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont suggested that Burma hold talks with representatives from China, India, the UN and Asean to search for a solution after the violent crackdown against monks and civilians.
The idea was first hatched during a meeting between Surayud and Gambari during the latter's trip here. Surayud was careful to exclude the big players such as the US, Russia and the EU from his plan at this juncture. They could join in the second stage if the situation allowed. Even with such a friendly approach, the regime was upset. The Thai envoy in Rangoon was summoned for a lecture on the Burmese way of thinking.
Finally, through the UN, Asean can be actively engaged with Burma and the credibility of the country as a member of Asean can be rehabilitated at the same time. Burma has obviously been studying the Cambodian situation back in the 1990s when the UN was a major player there. Successful UN operations in the past have always included the presence of international monitoring units and others. A peaceful transition of power in Burma, which the junta still resists, would involve the presence of an international supervisory board with numerous subcommittees to handle complicated issues related to national reconciliation, power sharing and the reconstruction process. Junta leaders want to be informed and engaged in the process at every level.
It remains to be seen how all players will engage with one another from now on. The litmus test is whether the junta really wants dialogue. The Burmese junta's brutality has been a blessing in disguise for Asean in more ways than one. True to its survival instincts, Asean is now determined to make the best out of the worst situation. Fittingly, this comes on the eve of its 40th anniversary.